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I. INTRODUCTION

Following the invasion of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional
Authority ("CPA") unilaterally imposed economic restructuring on
the country when international law strictly forbids altering legal
institutions of an occupied territory, and Security Council Resolution
1483, which authorized the U.S. and U.K. to undertake administrative
and fiduciary responsibilities, also did not sanction the reforms. 1 In
March 2013, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
produced its final report2 and the investigation acknowledged that
occupation operations were "frequently in the breach," but
underscored the lesson that institutional transformations can be painful
while also ultimately contributing to stability in fragile states. 3 With
societal divisions and an insurgency in Iraq in 2014, Iraq is now less
stable than before the 2003 invasion. Also, a rudimentary lesson in
reconstruction and reform is conspicuous from assessing the cause of
the drastic fluctuations and economic viability of the Iraqi population.
The following chart depicts the positive correlation between oil
revenue and per capita income over the past thirty years. 4

1. See infra Parts III, IV.
2. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION (SIGIR), LEARNING
FROM
IRAQ
(Mar.
2013),
available
at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001083907/http://www.sigir.mil/le
amingfromiraq/index.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2015) [hereinafter SIGIR].
3. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., A Golden Moment: Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to
Strengthen the U.S. Approach to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 34
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 17, 17-18 (2010).
4. Iraq's average daily revenues per year constructed with Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") ASP data for annual production
multiplied by average yearly price per barrel from 1970 to 2012. See generally Table
3.6: Daily and Cumulative Crude Oil Production in OPEC Members, Organization
of
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries
(2014),
available
at
http://www. opec. org/library/ Annual %20S tatistical %20 Bulletin/interactive/current/
FileZ/Main-Dateien/Section3.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (providing Iraq's
average annual oil production); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Petroleum & Other Liquids:
Cushing, OK WT! Spot Price FOB, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeatHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=A (last
visited Nov. 20, 2015) (providing annual per barrel price in US dollars from 1986 to
2012); see Per Capita GDP at Current Prices - U.S. Dollars, U.N. DATA, available
at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=gr1D%3A101 %3Bcurr1D%3AUSD
%3BpcF1ag%3Al (last visited Nov. 20, 2015); Historical Oil Prices Chart,
FORECASTCHART, available at http://www.forecast-chart.com/chart-crude-oil.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (providing monthly per barrel price of oil in US dollars
from 1970 to 1985).
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Iraqi per capita income plummeted after 1990 5 and by 2003
Iraq was ranked seventy-first out of ninety-four developing countries
for economic well-being on the U.N. Poverty index in 2003. 6 Over
80% of the Iraqi population lived in poverty. 7 The astounding plunge
in income that began in the early 1990s was a direct consequence of
the severe economic sanctions that the Security Council placed on the
Iraqi people for over a decade following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In
his 2006 book, former U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Hans
C. Von Sponeck, documented the misery inflicted on the Iraqi people
as "cold blooded" and explained that U.S. and U.K. leaders politically
manipulated foreign relations with propaganda so that few decisionmakers outside of Iraq were willing to cease the suffering. 8 The
5. Steve Shifferes, Iraq's Economy Declines by Half, BBC (Oct. 10, 2003, 3:02
PM), available at http:!/news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/business/3181248 .stm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2015) (using alternative measures, reporting that Iraqi income went from
$3600 in 1980, to $770-1020 in 2001, and to $450-610 by the end of2003).
U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT:
6.
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END HUMAN
POVERTY 247 (2003).
7. Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2295, 2327 (2007) (citing UNDP ARAB
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE
GENERATIONS (2002)).
8. H.C. VON SPONECK, A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE UN SANCTIONS
REGIME IN IRAQ 13 (2006); see also CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS
AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 9 (2000) (noting that U.S. officials were
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sanctions arguably violated humanitarian law 9 as hundreds of
thousands of Iraqis were estimated to have died as a result of
malnutrition and inadequate medical care. 10 Iraqis did not believe that
they should have been punished for Hussein's act of invading
Kuwait, 11 and scholars have long debated the uncertain effectiveness
of unilateral and third-party sanctions on altering the objectionable
policies of a target-govemment. 12
The economic juncture occurred after the 2003 war. Security
Council Resolution 1483 lifted economic and trade sanctions on Iraq,
but real economic conditions for common Iraqis worsened after the
invasion because of the chaotic economic, civil, and political
conditions plaguing the country several years into the occupation. 13
Despite that it was a decade of U.S.- and U.K.-led sanctions that were

cognizant of the suffering, with National Security Advisor Sandy Berger stating that
the UN sanction program was "unprecedented for its severity in the whole of world
history"). See generally Reem Bahdi, Book Review, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS
JUST. 365, 366-67 (2007) (reviewing HANS C. VON SPONECK, A DIFFERENT KIND
OF WAR: THE UN SANCTIONS REGIME IN IRAQ (2006)). During the sanction period,
the US tried to block watertankers from reaching civilians but the UN condemned
the move and noted that "access to clean drinking water" was "the major cause of
child deaths," and the US was concerned that vaccines for infant diseases could be
used for chemical weapons, but UNICEF and the World Health Organization
protested and European biological weapons experts remarked that such a claim was
"flatly impossible" scientifically. NOAM CHOMSKY, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL 128
(2004) (citing Joy Gordon, Cool War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass
Destruction, HARPER'S, Nov. 2002, at 43-49).
9. RICHARD FALK, THE COSTS OF WAR: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE UN, AND
WORLD ORDER AFTER IRAQ 46-47 (2008).
10. Stefan M. Brooks, Economic Effects of the Persian Gulf War on Iraq, in
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MIDDLE EAST WARS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE PERSIAN
GULF, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ CONFLICTS 400 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2010) ("[I]t
is estimated that anywhere from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousandsperhaps even 1 million-Iraqis, disproportionately children, died under the
sanctions regimes during 1990-2003. ").
11 . See Aida Dabbas & Jillian Schwedler, Protesting Sanctions Against Iraq:
A View From Jordan, 208 MIDDLE EAST REP. 37, 37 (1998).
12. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 8 (3d ed. 2007); see also Jeffrey
A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 905,906,
924-25 (2009); Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary
Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 91 (1998) ("[A]n
international consensus does appear to be building that the unilateral extraterritorial
application of these controls to third parties is impermissible .... [T]he international
community is coming to regard the blacklisting of third parties, or secondary
boycotts, as 'unreasonable,' and therefore an unjustified intrusion upon the
sovereignty of the neutral state.").
13. Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2298.
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solely responsible for impoverishing the Iraqi people, after the
invasion, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that "Iraq [has] a
completely failed economy." 14 The Bush Administration's CPA
initiated a rhetoric campaign that linked Iraqi prosperity to the need to
impose market and capitalism reforms 15 even though merely dropping
sanctions and permitting Iraqis to freely export oil would have raised
per capita income fivefold. This post-war boon was particularly
noticeable because long-term trends in the per barrel market price
more than quadrupled during the occupation. 16 Oil-rich countries
prospered while the rest of the world hit a recession. 17
The U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003 devastated infrastructure 18
and the impact on U.S. taxpayers was scandalous. Prior to the
invasion, the Bush Administration represented to the American public
that the war would cost approximately $50 to $60 billion and
repeatedly evaded inquiries from reporters about deeper and
prolonged cost estimates, which were expenditures that may have also
been relevant to the American economy proceeding into a recession. 19
14. L. PAUL BREMER III, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A
FUTURE OF HOPE 114 (2006).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market
Expectations, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 193, 273-77 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky,
Geopolitics] (noting also that the drastic surge in oil prices was partially due to the
uncertainty and turmoil in the oil market which reverberated after the invasion and
from the indeterminate impact on other OPEC and oil-producing countries).
17. Alaalhsan Salloom & Yibing Ding, Macroeconomic Effects of the (200809) Global Financial Crisis on the Arab Countries, 2 BERKELEY J. Soc. Sci. 1, 1-3
(2012) (stating that the 2008-09 "financial crisis has been described as the worst
global financial crisis ... since the Great Depression in the 1930s" but also noting
that "annual GDP growth in real terms reached 5.9% for the Arab region as a whole"
from 2006 to 2008).
18. Conor McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military
Occupation: Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
L. 43, 62 (2005) (explaining that the Hague Conventions make it clear that it is "not
permissible for an occupying power to allow an occupied territory to fester in a state
of economic, social, political and infrastructural retardation created by the conflict
from which the occupation has resulted."). Hostility may be intense when civilians,
cultural items, and infrastructure are inadequately protected during conflict as the
laws of war require. See Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and
International Law: A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 203-05
(2005).
19. See Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. 29, 8491 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Politico] (discussing the Bush administration's
evasion of costs and neglect of economic consequences); Michael Boyle, How the
US Public Was Defrauded by the Hidden Cost ofthe Iraq War, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11,
2013,
8:30
AM),
available
at
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Due to the near nine-year occupation, expenditures mounted, and may
cost American taxpayers $3. 7 trillion when considering continuing
medical expenditures for American troop injuries. 20 Despite the
astronomical figure of $3. 7 trillion, the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction stated that $60 billion was spent on reconstruction
and only about $21 billion of that amount was clearly earmarked for
construction projects, with the rest predominantly being spent on
construction-related security objectives. 21
Congressional debate was waged over the extent that Iraq
should have funded its own reconstruction, 22 but it now appears that
Iraq has paid in another way. The Bush Administration continued to
maintain that the Iraq War was not executed over an interest in oil, but
affirmed that the U.S. would "protect Iraq's natural resources" from
Hussein's regime, 23 and stripped the pre-war oil contracts that China,
France, and Russia had consummated with Hussein's regime. 24 In
April 2013, CNN reported on Iraq's metamorphosis from a
nationalized oil industry prior to the invasion to a privatized industry
that is now dominated by W estem oil companies: "Yes, the Iraq War
was a war for oil, and it was a war with winners: Big Oil." 25 Iraqis
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/11/us-public-defraudedhidden-cost-iraq-war (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (stating that prior to the war "the
Bush administration estimated that it would cost $50-60 [billion] to overthrow
Saddam Hussein and establish a functioning government . . . Some estimates
suggest[] that it may even eventually cost as much as $3.7 [trillion.]").
20. Boyle, supra note 19 (noting that during the occupation, the extent of
expenditures allocated for the Iraq War was not clearly designated on the American
budget).
21. SIGIR, supra note 2, at 9; Boyle, supra note 19 (estimating $90 billion).
22. Albio Sires, Iraq Should Pay for Its Reconstruction, HILL (Mar. 14, 2007,
11 :40 AM), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/28785-iraqshould-pay-for-for-its-reconstruction (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("American
taxpayers have already paid $379 billion," and H.R. 1325 was introduced to
"require[] the Iraqi government to match all U.S. funds spent for reconstruction in
Iraq.").
23. In the President's Words: The Rights and Aspirations of the Iraqi People,
WHITE
HOUSE
(July
8,
2004),
available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/rightsandasp.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015)
(citing President George W. Bush, Address at the Washington Hilton Hotel (Feb.
26, 2003)).
24. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 209,221, 226-27.
25. Antonia Juhasz, Why the War in Iraq was Fought for Big Oil, CNN (Apr.
15, 2013, 7:42 AM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraqwar-oil-juhasz/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015); Christopher Layne, From
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing, in THE USE OF FORCE: MILITARY POWER
AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 283, 285 (Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz eds.,
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were not left aghast over this outcome because seven years earlier a
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research poll revealed that
76% of Iraqis believed that the invasion was "to control Iraqi oil."26
Antonia Juhasz, author or The Tyranny of Oil (2008) and The Bush
Agenda (2006), emphasizes that "ExxonMobil, BP and Shell were
among the oil companies that 'played the most aggressive roles in
lobbying their governments to ensure that the invasion would result in
an Iraq open to foreign oil companies. 27
The extraordinary per capita income surge for Iraqis in recent
years is unrelated to the CPA's capitalist legal transplants, and, over
the long-run, it is not apparent that Iraqis should be grateful to the U .K.
and the U.S. after being punished economically for over a decade
6th ed. 2004) (calling access to Persian Gulfoil a vital U.S. security interest); Nafeez
Ahmed, Iraq Blowback: Isis Rise Manufactured by Insatiable Oil Addition,
GUARDIAN
(June
16,
2014,
12:17
PM),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/ 16/blowbackisis-iraq-manufactured-oil-addiction (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("The meteoric rise
of Isis is a predictable consequence of a longstanding US-led geostrategy in the
Middle East that has seen tyrants and terrorists as tools to expedite access to regional
oil and gas resources."). France, China, and Russia, all permanent Security Council
members, also recently were awarded contracts in Iraq. Press Release, Technip,
Technip awarded FEED contract in Basra, Iraq (Apr. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.technip.com/en/press/technip-awarded-feed-contract-basra-iraq
(last
visited Nov. 20, 2015); Tim Arango & Clifford Krauss, China Is Reaping Biggest
Bene.fits of Iraq Oil Boom, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/world/middleeast/china-reaps-biggestbenefits-of-iraq-oil-boom.html ?pagewanted=all&_r=O (last visited Nov. 20, 2015);
Andrew Critchlow, Russia's Lukoil Opens Giant Iraq Oil Field, Adding to Crude
Glut,
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
29,
2014,
4:58
PM),
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/ 10731708/Rus
sias-Lukoil-opens-giant-Iraq-oil-field-adding-to-crude-glut.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2015). These later oil concessions would presumably increase the interest of
these key countries in ensuring support for the investment-friendly government and
legal structure. Peter Ford, Why China Stays Out of Islamic State Fight, For Now,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Sept.
26,
2014),
available
at
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0926/Why-China-stays-outof-Islamic-State-fight-for-now (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (raising the fact that
China has significant oil contracts in Iraq but did not want to get involved as a
member of any "coalition" after the US began bombing ISIS because China has
"mistrust of US intentions.").
26. Iraqi Attitudes: Survey Documents Big Changes, U. MICH. NEWS SERV.
(June
14,
2006),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/200607 l 40223 l 5/http://www.umich.edu/news/index.ht
ml?Releases/2006/Jun06/r061406a (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
27. Dahr Jamail, Western Oil Firm Remain as US Exits Iraq, AL JAZEERA (Jan.
7,
2012,
6:45
PM),
available
at
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011 /12/20 l l l 22813134071641.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
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during Hussein's rule. Moreover, despite that Iraq's per capita income
has significantly increased in recent years, some percentage of the
improved domestic production represents value collected by
multinational oil companies. Select individuals and groups in Iraq
have also enriched themselves while the common Iraqi is destitute,
and it is this desperation and hostility toward Prime Minister Maliki,
a twenty-three year Iraqi defector-exile who monopolized oil revenues
and licenses, 28 that are underlying causes of the uprising that swept the
country with violence in 2014. 29
This current framework unfolded gradually in a country with a
population subject to a humanitarian catastrophe and initiated with
28. Christopher Helman, How Iraq's Kurds May Be The Unlikely Losers in the
Chaos, FORBES (June 12, 2014, 5:51 PM), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/06/12/how-iraqs-kurds-maybe-the-unlikely-losers-in-the-isis-chaos/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("For years the
Kurds have been at loggerheads with the oil ministry in Baghdad" because Kurds
want freedom to export oil but "Baghdad insists that only the federal government
can license exports and that unilateral exports are blatantly illegal."). Maliki is an
Iraqi exile of twenty-three years and was ironically personally welcomed into that
leadership position by George W. Bush. Michael Abramowitz, Bush's Gut Feeling
On Maliki Is Positive, WASH. POST (June 18, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700662 .html (last visited Nov. 20,
2015).
29. Analyzing Potential Challenges of Fighting the Islamic State, PBS
NEWSHOUR
(Sept.
11,
2014,
6:22
PM),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/analyzing-potential-challenges-fighting-islamicstate/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("ISIS emerged because of certain conditions in
this region, disorder, dysfunction, alienation, the residue of European colonialism"
and the "key facts are that efforts on the part of the United States to use military
power to bring ... stability [and] democracy to this region ... have actually fostered
greater instability."); Shashank Bengali & Patrick J. McDonnell, Resignation of
Prime Minister Maliki Gives Rise to Hope in Iraq, L.A. Times (Aug. 15, 2014, 5:28
PM), available at http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-malikiresignation-relief-20140815-story.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("Sunni leaders
accuse Maliki' s Shiite-dominated government and security forces of marginalizing
members of their sect as well as carrying out unlawful abductions and other abuses.
Those policies, they say, have fueled support for the Islamic State militants.");
Michael Stephens, Iraq Crisis: How Extreme Are the Fighters in Isis?, BBC (June
21, 2014), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27945954
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("Travelling around the country in recent days, I have
been shocked at the levels of deprivation that some of Iraq's citizens have endured.
[The recent insurgency is not driven by a jihadist mentality but] is a more general
uprising of large groupings of disaffected communities throughout north-western
Iraq and a product of years of social exclusion, poor governance and corruption by
the Iraqi government."); Iraq in Ruins: Post-War Life Overshadowed by Crumbling
Infrastructure, Corruption, Poverty, RT TV (May 17, 2013, 9:56 AM), available at
http://rt.com/news/iraq-poverty-war-crisis-414/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("Iraqi
infrastructure is constantly failing and people are forced to beg.").

!SIS
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Bush Administration and CPA rhetoric that promoted basic market
economic reforms and evolved to deeper capitalist reforms with tacit
acceptance akin to the same reason a frog meets its fate by not leaping
out of a pot of hot water as it progressively gets hotter. The period of
CPA governance and its dictates are critical to the present status of
Iraq's political and economic system because for the past eight years
Prime Minister Maliki became a dictator, established a mafia to
terrorize society, suppressed political dissent, corruptly benefited
himself and his cronies, and consequently locked in reforms without
the democratic process functioning. 30 Part II begins with the initial
rhetoric, which was that Iraq needed a market economy to nourish
democratization and Part III discusses how the CPA transplanted new
capitalist codes wholesale on Iraq.
Part IV emphasizes how
privatization programs were advocated and how unrestricted foreign
investment rules were instituted in conjunction with a free-for-all
dollarization of the Iraqi economy, which furnished purchasing power
and surreptitiously enhanced favoritism for the occupation due to
humanitarian dependence. Part V discusses reconstruction contracts
in Iraq, which was the occupation's paramount obligation because of
the devastation wrought by bombing and war operations. However,
funding allocated to rebuilding represented only one-half of one
30. See Zaid Al-Ali, How Maliki Ruined Iraq, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 19, 2014),
available

at

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/19/how_maliki_ruined_iraq_armed
_forces_isis (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (writing of Maliki's suppression of dissent
and killing, torturing, and jailing ofprotestors); Lord Maginnis, A Fictitious !SIL to
Scare Us Away From the Truth in Iraq, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:59
AM),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/lord-maginnis/iraqisil_b_5494529.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (explaining that "Corruption in the
government and those affiliated to the government is almost unimaginable with
billions of dollar embezzled and laundered, thus crippling the country's economy"
and a member of the UK House of Lords writing that "Maliki has created a Mafialike network of criminals and assassins to eliminate the voice of opposition at every
level" and estimated that an average of a thousand Sunnis have been killed every
month for the past decade by Maliki's assassins); Arwa Damon & Mohammed
Tawfeeq, Iraq's Leader Becoming a New 'Dictator,' Deputy Warns, CNN (Dec. 13,
2011, 6:33 PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/13/world/meast/iraqmaliki/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (reporting that Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saleh
al-Mutlag expressed to CNN that he was "shocked" to witness President Barack
Obama address Maliki as "the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and
democratic Iraq" when Maliki had been ignoring power-sharing institutions and
when the US left Iraq "with a dictator" who systematically suppresses dissent with
impunity, and further stating that the country is "going toward a dictatorship" and
"[p ]eople are not going to accept that, and most likely they are going to ask for the
division of the country. And this is going to be a disaster").
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percent of the actual total U.S. taxpayer spending for the Iraq war and
occupation31 and the functioning of the procurement process provides
lessons of an abysmal application of the Rule of Law.
II. SIMMERING: IMPOSING AN AGENDA BY INITIATING LESS
CONTROVERSIAL DISCOURSE
The Bush Administration's rationale for invading and
occupying Iraq was to disarm the country of supposedly existing
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon programs, which ultimately
did not exist. 32 Yale Law Professors Ackerman and Hathaway
punctuate that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was a
limited authorization to use the U.S. military conditioned on there
being an actual imminent threat, which means that when the White
House began offering additional rationalizations after the war,
particularly of humanitarian intervention, "such talk was blatantly
inconsistent with the plain language of the 2002 resolution. 33 In
2008, after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI")
completed its five-year investigation, the SSCI Chairman remarked:
"In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented
intelligence as fact when it was unsubstantiated, contradicted or even
nonexistent. ... Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into
war under false pretenses." 34 The post facto rationalization of
"liberating" the country was not a legitimate justification for war, but
political liberalization under }us post helium can reasonably be
31. Using the $21 billion of actual construction contract spending divided by
an estimated $3. 7 trillion in war and occupation spending. Boyle, supra note 19.
This means that the other 99.5% paid by US taxpayers represented direct and
derivative costs for the near nine-year military occupation and suggests that
quibbling over whether Iraq should pay for its own reconstruction was almost
incidental relative to costs borne by American taxpayers for non-reconstruction
operations.
32. Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary
Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 875-82 (2011).
33. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution:
Iraq and the Crisis ofPresidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447,464 (2011); see
also Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary
Presumptions and Burdens ofProof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 295, 350-69
(2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon Inspections].
34. Press Release, Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Intelligence
Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence (June 5,
2008),
available
at
http ://web.archive.org/web/2008060616203 3/http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/re
cord.cfm?id=298775 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
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interpreted to mean establishing institutions for democracy, holding
elections, and instituting human rights protections. 35 These reforms,
during a foreign occupation, are particularly logical because it is the
citizenry who will live under the laws and should have the selfdetermination right to choose the market structure, the degree of
economic openness, and protectionist measures. Instead, the CPA and
Bush administration officials assumed a much deeper prerogative by
dictating a unilaterally-chosen economic reform agenda for Iraq and
did so piecemeal by commencing with discourse that annexed less
controversial market principles with democratization and eventually
progressed to an assumption that complete economic openness and
unrestricted capitalism are inseparable from democratization, which is
not a mainstream or consensus international community norm. 36
35. RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY
FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing when states
violate minimum standards by committing, permitting, or threatening intolerable
acts against their own people or other nations, then some of the privileges of
sovereignty are forfeited); Robert Bejesky, Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights
Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LOY. L. REV. 821, 829-31 (2012)
(noting that ensuring adequate human rights standards are met is a legitimate
occupier prerogative as universal standards are required in a number of human rights
agreements). With respect to assisting the emergence of institutions of selfgovernment, self-determination permits a people with a common connection to a
given territory to have the right to govern their own affairs, which might include
state sovereignty, as was critical during the era of decolonization. See G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("The will of the people shall be the basis
of the authority of government."); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, opened/or signature Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-20, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("[a]ll peoples have the right of selfdetermination," the right to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development.").
36. James Thuo Gathii, Commerce, Conquest, and Wartime Confiscation, 31
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 709, 737 (2006) (stating that not even the US has such a laissez
faire economy as the one that the CPA imposed on Iraq); Edwin Villmoare, The Fog
of Nation Building: Lessons from Kosovo?, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 25, 26 (2004)
(mentioning that from the perspective of domestic institution building, "there can be
no genuine progress in any one of these initiatives [of democracy, economic
development, and nation building] if there is not progress in all," but also
recognizing the fairly universal failures outside the West). Markets are the dominant
ideology but no country in the world is completely open to foreign investment and
trade, and no newly emerging market economy would likely abruptly open its
banking industry without some foreign ownership restrictions or protectionist
regulations. James R. Barth, Gerald Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Bank Regulation
and Supervision in 180 Countries from 1999 to 2011, 5 J. FIN. ECON. POL'Y 111,
177 (2013) (noting that in a study of 180 countries over the 1999 to 2011 period,
"[t]here is substantial heterogeneity of bank regulatory and supervisory policies
across countries" but there has been some convergence over the past dozen years).
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For example, the Bush Administration's September 2002
National Security Strategy states: "America will encourage the
advancement of democracy and economic openness in . . . nations,
because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and
international order." 37 CPA Administrator Paul Bremer stated: "A
free economy and a free people go hand in hand. History tells us that
substantial and broadly held resources, protected by property rights,
are the best protection of political freedom. Building such prosperity
in Iraq will be a key measure of our success here." 38 These
propositions are not inconsistent with basic reform agendas; even
communist systems floundered when they endeavored to completely
abolish market mechanisms 39 and the U.S. and Europe traversed
several decades in which socialism, the welfare state, and more public
utilities were the norm. 40
Even the most ambitious World Trade Organization ("WTO") members traversed
intense domestic political debates over how certain industries and commodities
would react to freer trade. Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy,
Presented at The Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs (Nov. 18, 1996) (noting the
"intense interest at the intersection of trade and competition policy" at the time of
WTO negotiations).
37. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED ST ATES OF AMERICA, fwd. (2002).
38. Robert Looney, The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraqi's Economic
Reconstruction, 57 MIDDLE E. J. 568,574 (2003).
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S
39.
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 11 (1977) (stating that the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
other communist system relied on markets, money, and prices as a method of
organizing transactions in society for consumer spending). Communist and
capitalist systems are predominantly distinguished by the former's authoritarian role
in generating production plans, but even the Russian people were able to accumulate
savings and hold rubles in bank accounts. PHILIP ROEDER, RED SUNSET: THE
FAILURE OF SOVIET POLITICS 152-53 (1993).
40. THOMAS PIK.ETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 154 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press 2014) (2013) (stating that Europeans in the postWorld War II era believed that capitalism was being eradicated); PAUL PIERSON,
DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE?: RAEGAN, THATCHER AND THE POLITICS OF
RETRENCHMENT 23, 39 (1994) (stating that welfare states became the norm across
advanced industrialized democracies, with 30% to 60% of GNP circulating through
government programs).
Keynesian economic principles balanced complete
socialization of the economy and unbridled capitalism. Peter A. Hall, Conclusion:
The Politics of Keynesian Ideas, in THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS:
KEYNESIANISM ACROSS NATIONS 361, 364-66 (Peter A. Hall ed., 1989). Every
capitalist democracy committed itself to providing public goods and social insurance
and engaged in macroeconomic management to avert "working-class
ROBERT FRANZESE, JR., MACROECONOMIC POLICIES OF
radicalization."
DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES 2, 9, 14 (2002) (further noting that only six of the 21

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/3

12

Bejesky: How the U.S. Occupation Imposed Economic Reforms on Iraq

2015] How the U.S. Occupation Imposed Economic Reforms

13

A population surely desires economic prosperity, which will
yield more societal stability, 41 but it is crucial for the population to
rationally choose its own market formulation because the population
could later be offended by the manner in which reforms are imposed
and how inequalities manifested, which may undermine effective
political institutions. 42 In her book, World on Fire, Yale Law
Professor Amy Chua states that "contrary to conventional wisdom,
markets and democracy-at least in the form in which they're
currently being promoted-may not be mutually-reinforcing in the
developing world. " 43 Creating a market system with new laws in a
developing country does not decidedly translate into imposing
unrestricted capitalism, favoring privatization of available public
assets, and promulgating undue "shock treatment,"44 all of which are
not congruous with the gradual capitalist evolutions of developed
Western economies. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate in Economics
and former Chief Economist at the World Bank, published an editorial
responding to the Bush administration's use of "shock therapy"
capitalism in Iraq. Stiglitz wrote:
[T]here is a broad consensus that shock therapy, at least at the level of
microeconomic reforms, failed, and that countries (Hungary, Poland,
and Slovenia) that took the gradualist approach to privatization and the
economically advanced democracies studied kept total public flows below 60% of
their Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") through 1990). Socialism was a middle
ground between strict capitalism and communism.
41. See 148 CONG. REC. HI 773-05(daily ed. May 1, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Watts) ("[W]e must reach out to developing nations across the globe, often beset by
forces of terror, and demonstrate how free markets, open trade, and private enterprise
under the rule of law can lead to prosperity for their citizens. Our national security
improves when global stability prevails."); Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. DEP'T STATE, available at http://20012009.state.gov/s/crs/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (espousing that its mission was "to
prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct
societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable
path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."). Market mechanisms and
capitalism are effective at developing society and wealth by delegating economic
ordering and emphasizing personal responsibility, but the problem is that imposed
laws and processes without regard to the desires of the Iraqi people and generating
socioeconomic turmoil undermined what market reforms were designed to achieve.
42. See JOHNFINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 174 (1980)(stating
that in societies where there is private ownership and excessive disparities in wealth,
inequalities without redistribution from the rich can lead to significant dissent).
43. Amy Chua, The Profitable and the Powerless: International Accountability

of Multinational Corporations: The Sixty Annual Grotius Lecture: World on Fire,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2004).
44. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE (2007).

Published by SURFACE, 2015

13

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 3

14

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 43: 1

reconstruction of institutional infrastructure managed their transitions
far better than those that tried to leapfrog into a laissez-faire economy.
This record suggests that one should think twice before trying shock
therapy again. But the Bush administration, backed by a few
handpicked Iraqis, is pushing Iraq towards an even more radical form
of shock therapy than was pursued in the former Soviet world. Indeed,
shock therapy's advocates argue that its failures were due not to
excessive speed - too much shock and not enough therapy - but to
insufficient shock. 45

Despite the evidence available in case studies indicating that
shock therapy failed to quickly blossom into prosperity, the U.S.
occupation reduced criticism for its own lack of conscientiousness
over the abrupt and sweeping capitalistic dictates by presenting the
reforms as mainstream and blessed by international economic
institutions. The CPA reportedly submitted drafts of CPA orders to
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund ("IMF") for
comment46 and the World Bank and IMF "strongly urged" that Iraq be
made "one of the most open economies in the world" for foreign
investment. 47 Besides the fact that a handful of the most economically
powerful countries, led by the U.S., have traditionally been able to
leverage voting power and compel policies within the Bretton Woods
Institutions ("BWl'') 48 and the fact that there was actually no public
45. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Iraq's Next Shock Will Be Shock Therapy, PROJECT
SYNDICATE
(Feb.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/ iraq-s-next-shock-will-be-shock-therapy (last visited
Nov. 21, 2015).
46. Brett H. McGurk, Revisiting the Law ofNation-Building: Iraq in Transition,
45 VA. J. INT'L. L. 451, 460 (2005).
47. Financial Reconstruction in Iraq: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'/
Trade & Fin. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs., 108th Cong. 53
(2005) [hereinafter Financial Reconstruction in Iraq] (statement of M. Peter
McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Development) (commenting that the
CPA's investment laws made Iraq "the most open economy in the region - and
frankly one of the more open economies of the world" and that those initiatives were
"strongly urged" by the World Bank during briefings with CPA).
48. See Kristen E. Boon, "Open for Business": International Financial
Institutions, Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 513, 574 n.222 (2007); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 503 (2002); PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING,
CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 67 (1991)
(noting that the IMF and World Bank, at creation, were required to be "beyond
political influence of any one country" and not be "unaccountable"). Responsibility
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record of the World Bank and IMF advice and therefore no certainty
that this advice was incorporated into the orders adopted by the CP A, 49
the CPA was not beholden to the World Bank's advice and
international economic institutions cannot exempt the CPA from
adhering to restrictions of occupation law. The CPA owed its
fiduciary obligations to the Iraqi people. However, what more can be
said about the prospect for compromising the integrity of an
international institution after Bush appointed Paul Wolfowitz, the
same neoconservative war hawk who advocated false claims that led
to the Iraq War50 and who lacked experience in economic
development, 51 to the position of president of the World Bank. 52
The 1990s "Washington Consensus" pressured countries to
fortify the free flow of investment and prodded structural adjustment,
austerity, and privatization programs, which proved controversial and
manipulative. 53 The U.N., IMF, World Bank, and other international
can be shirked when the institution or the state is employed as the unit of analysis
without recognizing that both the dominate state and the institution can also be
perceived as one in the same or at least incorporate the same interests, values, and
assumptions. What was implemented for Iraq appears to go well beyond published
World Bank Guidelines to support market economies. Alan K. Audi, Iraq's New

Investment Laws and the Standard of Civilization: A Case Study on the Limits of
International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 335, 350-51 (2004).
49. Boon, supra note 48, at 550.
50. See Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 38-52 (discussing advocacy of the
neoconservative group that planned for and advocated for the Iraq War long before
the invasion).
51. See Liam Halligan, The World Bank Will Be Hated, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 20,
2005, 12:01 AM), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2912396/fheWorld-Bank-will-be-hated.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (reporting that Nobel
Laureate in economics Joseph Stiglitz stated about Wolfowitiz's appointment that
"[ t]he World Bank will once again become a hate figure" and his concern is that "the
World Bank will now become an explicit instrument of US foreign policy"); see
generally PETER J. HAMMER, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY AT THE WORLD BANK:
REFORMING PARADOXES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 163 n.13 (2013) (reporting
that after Wolfowitz's candidacy for the World Bank position was announced,
Columbia University Economics Professor Jeffrey Sachs stated that "it's time for
other candidates to come forward who have experience in development ... This is
a position on which hundreds of millions of people depend for their lives").
52. Mark Tran, Bush Picks Wolfowitz to Head World Bank, GUARDIAN (Mar.
at
available
AM),
7:35
2005,
16,
(last
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/mar/16/usnews.paulwolfowitz
visited Nov. 20, 2015).
53. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002); Antonio Perez, Prescriptions for Iraq, Predictions for Russia and

Performance for China: Legal Frameworks for Economic Transition in Iraq Occupation Under the Law of War vs. Global Governance Under the Law ofPeace,
18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 53, 53 (2004) (stating that the Washington Consensus
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institutions were never authorized to impose lawmaking on foreign
countries 54 and must instead respect the domestic economic and
political sovereignty of countries. 55 Becoming a member of the IMF
and promising to adhere to principles of "good governance," to
implement transparent financial and economic policy, and to assure
financial accountability, 56 has never clearly granted the IMF a right to
impose austerity and privatization programs. 57 Instead, the IMF
resolutely impels ultimatums as conditions on loans, 58 including when
consistently was under attack); Audi, supra note 48, at 360 (noting discontent with
the Washington Consensus); John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think
About the Washington Consensus?, 15 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 251, 251-52,
255 (2000) (scholar who coined the term "Washington Consensus" explaining that
he intended the term to apply to "market fundamentalism," that the policies that were
implemented by the Bank may have been more expansive than his definition, and
that it is incorrect to presume that the policies implemented correctly represent the
standards that do garner significant unanimity).
54. See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES: HOLDING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR
ACTS OF FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT 396 (2006) (noting the traditional role of the
World Bank and IMF that changed from merely lending to a law-making role by
using conditionality).
5 5. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. IV, § 3(b),
July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (stating that in exchange for member
countries permitting the IMF to consent to monitoring of a member country's
financial flows, the IMF must "respect the domestic social and political policies of
members."); Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development art. IV,§ 10, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2
U.N.T.S. 134 ("The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of
any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character
of the member or members concerned.").
56. Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Fiscal Policies:
Declaration of Principles, INT'L MONETARY FUND 5, 13-15 (Sept. 26, 1999),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/eng/code2e.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2015).
57. See generally Naomi Klein, Bomb Before you Buy: The Economics of War,
2 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 331, 332-334 (2004) (noting that countries across the
world have banded together in dissent to IMF recommendations and rejecting
privatizations).
58. See Dustin Sharp, The Significance of Human Rights for the Debt of
Countries in Transition, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS
WORK 47, 50 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Cernic eds., 2014)
(emphasizing that the IMF and other international financial institutions have
intensely influenced country spending and set conditions for loans, such as with
structural adjustment programs); see Boon, supra note 48, at 526-28 (noting that
while nothing in the World Bank and IMF Charters, as agreed upon by member or
as official policies, authorizes the economic institutions to engage in lawmaking,
since the late-1990s, the World Bank and IMF have explicitly advocated legal and
judicial reform projects and have provided advice and even draft laws on banking,
taxation, finance, telecommunications, commercial law, and other fiscal matters).
The programs generally advocate liberalization, minimal government regulation,
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the borrowing country may not have been primarily to blame for the
economic distress ultimately leading to the reliance on BWis. 59
Experts have maintained that the BWis' neoliberal dictates
compounded the global financial crisis in the late-1990s 60 and
relegated poor countries to a state of financial dependency. 61
Consequently, one might conceive that the Bretton Woods institutions
would relish the opportunity to render similar counsel just a few years
later and introduce neoliberal reform on a developing country with an
enormous financial potential that could be achieved by lifting
sanctions on oil exports and tapping more oil wells to service future
debt obligations. However, instead of permitting Iraq to reach a point
of self-sufficiency, early dependency was implanted and conditions
were imposed even though it was a decade of external sanctions that
crippled Iraq's economy. In September 2004, a United Nations World
Food Program investigation discovered that 6.5 million Iraqis, or 25%
and max1m1zmg incentives for investment and clearly promote self-interested
purposes of the institutions. See id. at 529, 532; but see IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE
WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 82 (1991) (former World Bank General
Counsel noting that there are limits to recommendations).
59. See generally Robert Bejesky, Currency Cooperation and Sovereign
Financial Obligations, 24 FLA. J. INT'L L. 91, 104-24 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky,
Currency Cooperation] (expressing that a country's financial and economic distress
may have been caused by or intensified by global economic conditions or odious
regimes (rather than a regime with a legitimate nexus to the populace), that the IMF
may grant loans to alleviate a crisis to prop up the currency and place conditions on
receipt of loans, and that the conditions may leave the populace with permanent
institutions even if the populace or a legitimate government did not cause the
conditions requiring the economic aid).
60. See Perez, supra note 53, at 53; Graciana del Castillo, When the Fighting
Stops: Economic Reconstruction of War-Torn Countries: The Role of the
International Financial Institutions, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2008)
(noting that the post-Cold War reconstruction agenda has not been that successful);
see e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, Argentina Default? Griesafault is
Much More Accurate, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2014, 11 :37 AM), available at
/argentina-default-griesafaulthttp://www.theguardian.com/business/20 l 2014/aug/07
more-accurate (last visited Nov. 21. 2015) ("For Argentina. the oath to its 2001
default started with the ballooning of its sovereign debt in the 1990s. which occurred
alongside neoliberal 'Washington Consensus' economic reforms that creditors
believed would enrich the countrv. The exoeriment failed. and the countrv suffered
a deeo economic and social crisis. with a recession that lasted from 1998 to 2002.
Bv the end. a record-high 57.5% of Argentinians were in poverty, and the
unemployment rate skyrocketed to 20.8 %.").
61. Fantu Cheru (Independent Expert), Effects of Structural Adjustment
Policies on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/50
(Feb. 24, 1999) ("The countries of sub-Saharan Africa, with their poor credit rating,
have largely been turned into an IMF 'macroeconomic guinea pig' since they depend
largely on resources from the multilateral institutions.").
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of the population, "remain highly dependent on [government] food
rations," 62 but three months later, Iraq's Interim Vice President Abdel
Mahdi extemporized about IMF austerity conditions being imposed on
Iraq in exchange for loans: "We really need to work on our subsidy
side. Subsidies are taking almost 60 percent of our budget. So this is
something we have to work on." 63 The IMF agreed to loan Iraq $2.5$4.3 billion over three years providing its budgetary directives were
implemented. 64 IMF conditions were introduced to slash food
subsidies and other public benefits, as they were in other countries. 65
III. GETTING HOTTER: IMPOSING NEW ECONOMIC LAW

REFORMS
Over its fourteen month existence, the CPA adopted over thirty
new economic laws, 66 which were predominantly skeletal capitalist
frameworks installed wholesale on Iraq. For example, modem
banking laws can span hundreds of pages with provisions that promote
reliable and efficient banking institutions, punish wrongdoing, and
protect consumers (and the CPA mentioned concern over these
dangers), 67 but the CPA' s banking law scrapped the preexisting
framework and adopted a 66-page law that was quite devoted to

62. Survey Shows High Prevalence of Food Insecurity in Iraq, WORLD FOOD
PROGRAMME (Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://www.wfp.org/news/newsrelease/survey-shows-high-prevalence-food-insecurity-iraq (last visited Nov. 21,
2015).
63. Emad Mekay, Challenges 2004-2005: U.S. to Take Bigger Bite of Iraq's
Economic Pie, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Dec. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.ipsnews.net/2004/ 12/challenges-2004-2005-us-to-take-bigger-bite-ofiraqs-economic-pie/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (reporting that there were hundreds
of Americans working in Iraqi government agencies and "helping the interim Iraqi
government continue to make major economic changes, including cuts to social
subsidies").
64. Id.; Mahmoud Hmoud, The Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and
Security Council Resolution 1483, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435, 452 (2004) (stating
that "the vast majority oflraqis depended on O.F.F. [Oil-for-Food program]").
65. Mekay, supra note 63. Country after country has been individually
pressured into this system because of many decade-long debt crises and now Iraq
was being coerced as well. See Bejesky, Currency Cooperation, supra note 59, at
104-24.
66. Boon, supra note 48, at 544.
67. Bank Law Order No. 40 of 2003 art. 2 (Coalition Provisional Authority
[CPA], Iraq) [hereinafter Bank Law] (stating that the "primary regulatory objective
of this Law is to maintain confidence in the banking system," and that secondary
objectives are "promoting public understanding of the banking system ...
protect[ing] ... depositors, and ... reduc[ing] financial crime ... ").
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opening Iraq to foreign banking institutions with branches,
subsidiaries, and representative offices. 68
Countries have routinely insulated their banking sector from
foreign dominance during globalization initiatives, 69 but Iraq's Bank
Law contained no provisions that restricted foreign banking
investment in Iraq in terms of acquiring domestic banks or as a
percentage of the banking economy. 70 In fact, the law eliminated
existing protections and endowed foreign banks with "national
treatment" as domestic banks, 71 placing Iraqi banks, with weaker
financial positions and without powerful parent offices in foreign
countries, at a competitive disadvantage. 72 The CPA-appointed Iraqi
68. See id. art. 1-23.
69. JAMES A. CAPORASO & MARY ANNE MADEIRA, GLOBALIZATION,
INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 158 (2012) (affirming that developing countries
have relied on protectionism in their banking industries and noting that "[l]arge
American or European banks can ... easily drive local banks out of business and
dominate the banking industry."). See generally MALCOLM COOK, BANKING
REFORM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE REGION 's DECISIVE DECADE (2008) (discussing
history of protectionism in banking sector in Southeast Asia); GERHARD FELS &
GEORGE SUTIJA, PROTECTIONISM AND INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1991).
70. Bank Law, supra note 67, art. 4, §§ 6-7 (CPA limiting the number of wholly
owned foreign banks to six until 2008 and permitting up to 50% foreign ownership
in "an existing or new domestic bank").
71. Id. art. 4, § 5; Financial Reconstruction in Iraq, supra note 47, at 101
(statement of John B. Taylor, Under Sec'y of the Treasury for lnt'l Affairs) (noting
that preexisting laws only permitted Arab banks to operate in Iraq).
72. See Financial Reconstruction in Iraq, supra note 71, at 101 (stating that
Iraqi banks "lack technology" and "a modern, efficient financial sector," but also
that "Iraqi authorities decided that it would be important for foreign banks to operate
in Iraq because of the experience, technology, and resources they can offer."). One
example of a competitive disadvantage is that a handful of Iraqi banks required 200
to 800 percent collateral for the amount sought to be obtained in a loan. Arlyn
Tobias Gajilan, Entrepreneurs in Iraq Tangle in U.S. Red Tape, CNN (Nov. 1,
2004 ),
available
at
http:!/money .cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_ archive/2004/ 11/01 /8190934/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015). With respect to "Iraqis" making choices for the banking
industry, Iraqi authorities at this point consisted of an Iraqi Governing Counsel with
25 members who were appointed by the CPA and who were not accepted by the
populace. See generally Governing Council oflraq Regulation No. 6 of2003 pmbl.
(CPA, Iraq); Monroe E. Price, Foreword: Iraq and the Making of State Media
Policy, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 15 (2007) ("The Iraqi Governing
Council . . . [was] largely appointed or selected by the CPA, [and] lacked
legitimacy."); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Death Starks an Experiment in Democracy,
WASH. POST (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wodvn/articles/A58888-2004Jun21.html (last visited Nov. 21. 2015) ("But Iraais
criticize the local councils and the interim national government as illegitimate
because their members were not elected."). Americans were appointed to Iraqi
government agencies, ran the agencies, and implemented economic reform. See
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agency heads possessed the authority to grant licenses to foreign banks
for an "indefinite" period of time 73 and the general policy for the
banking system was driven by the fact that the Central Bank of Iraq
was required to adhere to the transnational integration mandates
contained in Order 56. 74
On April 26, 2004, CPA Order 81 imposed legal protections
for trade-related intellectual property. 75 The policy, cited in the third
sentence of Order 81, asserts that Iraq's intellectual property laws
were deficient and that the Governing Council affirmed that
"significant change in the Iraqi intellectual property system [is]
necessary to improve the economic condition of the people of Iraq." 76
The CPA spoke on behalf of the Iraqi people even though many of
these provisions were rejected outright by developing countries when
they were introduced as WTO side agreements in 1995. 77 Iraqis were
not in a position to chum out inventions to utilize the reciprocal
monopoly rights that intellectual property protections afford, but the
law instead behooves the owners of intellectual property attached to
imports and foreign investments.
The CPA's dictates, premised on extrapolations in the
occupation's mandate, were accordant with the agenda and rhetoric of
the Bush White House. At a May 9, 2003 commencement address,
President Bush promoted the notion of a U.S.-Middle East free trade
generally Mekay, supra note 63.
73. Bank Law, supra note 67, art. 4, § 2 ("[L]icense[s] or permit[s] granted
under this Law shall be granted in writing for an indefinite period of time.").
74. See generally Central Bank Law Order No. 56 of2004 art. 2 (CPA, Iraq).
75. See generally Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Information,
Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety Law Order No. 81 of2004 pmbl. (CPA, Iraq).
76. Id.
77. See generally id. § 1, 54 (providing for the gamut of IP protections,
including the "Plant Variety Law," to protect patent rights in genetically-modified
plant species); see GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP: Latin AMERICA, THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 160 (2006) ("'Iraqi Order
81' even prohibited Iraqi farmers from saving heirloom seeds from one year to the
next, obliging them to buy them anew each season from corporations like Monsanto
and Dow Chemical . . . "); ERIC HERRING & GLEN RANGWALA, IRAQ IN
FRAGMENTS: THE OCCUPATION AND ITS LEGACY 240 (2005) (noting that the CPA
adopted Order Number 81 that banned Iraqi farmers from saving genetically
modified seeds from year to year and the Protection of New Plant Varieties had only
48 members); Thomas A. Wathen, Trade Policy: Clouds in the Vision of
Sustainability, in BUILDlNG SUSTAINABLE SOCIETIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR A POSTINDUSTRIAL WORLD 76 (Dennis C. Pirages ed., 1996) (stating that in the case of
intellectual property protections, developing countries were wary of the protections
but were given a ten year grace period to implement rules).
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agreement and ostensibly presumed that "liberty," "freedom,"
"justice," and "democracy," were byproducts of the expansion of
capitalism. 78 One month later and concomitant with experts predicting
that Iraqi businesses would be unable to compete with the newlyappearing deluge of inexpensive imports, Bush administration
officials were declaring a need to promptly "hammer[] out a free-trade
agreement between Iraq and the United States" 79 and of sponsoring
WTO membership for Iraq. 80
The CPA scrambled to expeditiously open Iraq's economy at
the domestic level, including by waiving and disposing of preexisting
Iraqi laws designed to protect domestic industry, 81 overhauling Iraqi
corporate law and securities law, suspending major pre-invasion
economic frameworks with the addition of new market regulations, 82
78. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Commencement Address at the
University of South Carolina (May 9, 2003) ("Across the globe, free markets and
trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught men and women the habits of
liberty . . .. [W]ith free markets and fair laws, the people of the Middle East will
grow in prosperity and freedom."); Susan L. Sakmar, Globalization and Trade
Initiatives in the Arab World: Historical Context, Progress to Date, and Prospects
for the Future, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 919, 920, 925 (2008) (noting that Bush proposed
that the United States take steps to create a Middle East Free Trade by 2013, which
would involve negotiating "comprehensive bilateral [Free Trade Agreements]" with
the US and "all countries in the region"); id. at 927 (noting that Bush further stated
that free trade would decrease poverty and make some countries less "vulnerable to
terrorist networks.").
79. Edmund L. Andrews, After the War: The Economy, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/01/world/after-war-economyafter-years-stagnation-iraqi-industries-are-falling-wave.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2015).
80. From the later declassified Future of Iraq Project reports, produced before
the invasion, the reports actively postulated and planned the steps needed to get Iraq
into the WTO. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FUTURE OF IRAQ PROJECT: OIL AND ENERGY
WORKING GROUP 66-70 (2003) (see section entitled Iraq: Economic Development,
the Oil Sector, and Membership of the WTO). In February 2004, Iraq attained
observer status at the WTO. Press Release, CPA, Iraq Achieves Observer Status at
the WTO (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpairaq/pressreleases/20040212_WTO.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
81. See Audi, supra note 48, at 335.
82. Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 1997 of2004 pmbl. (CPA, Iraq)
("[S]ome of the rules concerning company formation and investment under the prior
regime no longer serve a relevant social or economic purpose ... "). The CPA's new
securities law eliminated the Baghdad Stock Exchange, removed all previous
government oversight, created a new Iraqi Stock Exchange, and then formed a new
Interim Iraq Securities Commission with core rules. Interim Law on Securities
Markets Order No. 74 of 2004 pmbl. (CPA, Iraq) ("Recognizing that some of the
regulations concerning securities markets under the prior regime are not well-suited
to a modern, efficient, transparent and independently regulated securities
market .... ").
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and lifting Iraqi trade protections, tariffs, and customs to permit the
free flow of foreign products into Iraq. 83 The CPA reduced tariffs on
imports to 5% and the Trade Bank of Iraq was constituted with an
initial capitalization of one hundred million dollars earmarked to
stimulate exports and imports. 84 A glaring negative impact of the
breakneck capitalist reforms was a long-term increase in the
unemployment rate, 85 which would predictably gall workers.
Apparently to marginalize dissent from the working class, the
combination of occupation initiatives and early Iraqi governments
classified state workers and civil servants and denied them the right to
organize and participate in collective bargaining, 86 arrested labor
leaders, blocked strikes, and even enacted new laws that would restrict
the right of labor to organize and strike in the future. 87
83. Trade Liberalization Policy Order No. 12 of 2003 § 1 (CPA, Iraq)
(suspending all tariffs and trade restrictions).
84. Trade Bank oflraq Order No. 20 of 2003, §§ 1, 4; Jeff Madrick, Economic
Scene; The Economic Plan for Iraq Seems Long on Ideology, Short on Common
Sense,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
2,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 10/02/business/economic-scene-economic-plan-foriraq-seems-long-ideology-short-common-sense.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015)
(noting the 5% tariff level and 15% corporate tax rate); see also Audi, supra note
48, at 335.
85. ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 15 (2006)
(remarking that three years into the occupation, approximately half oflraqi workers
were unemployed).
86. Shiva Falsafi, Civil Society and Democracy in Japan, Iran, Iraq and
Beyond, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357,425 (2010).
supra note 77, at 159 (emphasizing the crackdown on organized
87. Grandin
labor); Falsafi, supra note 86, at 425 (noting that after the CPA dissolved and in
August 2005, the Iraqi government passed Decree 8750 which permitted the seizure
of union assets, which further weakened labor movements); Matthew Harwood,
Pinkertons at the CPA, WASH. MONTHLY (Apr. 2005), available at
http ://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0504 .harwood.html (last visited
Nov.21.2015) (describing the massacre ofunion officials and that "Americans have
largely left the Iraqi unions to fend for themselves, and in some cases actively
undercut them."); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Back Off On Plans to Reform
Economy, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2003), available at http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2003-l2-28/news/0312270356_1_iraq-s-reconstruction-iraqis-civiloccupation (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (stating that a 60% unemployment rate in
Iraq has infuriated labor and that Bremer's intention to sell off state-owned
enterprises further antagonized workers). In June 2005, Prime Minister lbraim Jafari
planned to shed public sector jobs according to neoliberal dictates even as
unemployment approached 50% and commentators believed that unemployment
was breeding insurgencies. Jonathan Finer & Omar Fekeiki, Tackling Another
Major Challenge in Iraq: Unemployment, WASH. POST (June 20, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/19/AR2005061900729 .html (last visited Nov. 21,
2015). Shrinking the size of the state to favor corporate and private ownership has
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The Bush administration appointed top Iraqi officials and crafted Iraqi
foreign economic policy, while labeling it Iraqi foreign policy, and
dispatched hundreds of American economic advisors to work in all
Iraqi government ministries. 88 U.S. advisors were making critical
economic decisions and sponsored the country's economic changes,
including by emphasizing privatization and slashing social
expenditures. 89 Imposing new rules and undermining the voice of
labor may have also truncated organized dissident to the economic
reform agenda. The treaty obligations and accords with BWis
leverage congruent domestic reform as an effective directive or cogent
obligation. The Bush administration and its CPA were quickly
"locking" Iraq into international treaties and foreign policies and
setting trajectories for domestic laws, to which Iraqis would later be
required to adhere, and this all transpired before elections were held. 90
IV. SCALDING: PROFFERING PRIVATIZATION
A. CPA Privatization Initiatives

Consistent with the general rhetorical position of the White
House, CPA Administrator Bremer' s discourse also conveyed the
significance of interaction among elements of reform, which included
emphasizing the importance of democratization, market prices,
foreign investment, efficient allocation of resources in the economy,
and ensuring strong property rights. 91 On July 8, 2003, Bremer
remarked:
long been promoted by the IMF and may benefit those who acquire privatized assets.
88. Mekay, supra note 63.
89. Id.
90. Despite much Bush administration rhetoric about quickly allowing selfrule, that was not the case. The Bush administration brought in its own government
and the result of this razzle-dazzle babble of "transition" authorities merely affirms
that institutional and legal choices were not the product of democratic choices. See
generally Robert Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin of the CPA: An Attribute of the
Unitary Executive, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 269, 279-291 (2015). The Bush
administration was entrenching pre-selected loyalists into power for long-term
allegiance to the occupation and locking in the rules.
See generally CPA Official Documents, CPA, available at
91.
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/#Orders (last visited Nov. 21. 2015) (list of
orders specifies the focus). For an example of assuming that the CPA possessed all
of the answers for Iraqi prosperity when political choices of the people should have
governed see Paul Bremer, Operation Iraqi Prosperity, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2003,
12:01 AM), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB105606663932885100
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015) {"The central lesson from past transitions is that the
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Privatization is obviously something we have been giving a lot of
thought to. When we sit down with the governing council. .. it is going
to be on the table. The governing council will be able to make
statements that could be seen as more binding and the trick will be to
figure out how we do this. Everybody knows we cannot wait until there
is an elected government to start economic reform. 92

The CPA's appointed members of the temporary Iraqi
governing bodies were powerless 93 and it is not true that "everybody
private sector must be encouraged to rapidly allocate resources to their most
productive uses. In other transition economies, the switch from value-destroying
public enterprises to value-creating private ones has been accomplished by
stimulating the growth of small and medium-sized private enterprises, which are best
able to create jobs quickly. This encouragement takes place by reducing the
subsidies to state-owned firms and establishing a clear and transparent commercial
code (as well as honest judges to enforce it). More generally, a well-established
system of property rights must be established in order for the economy to grow....
Opening Iraq to the rest of the world also promises to pay big dividends.").
92. Looney, supra note 38, at 574.
93. Bremer endowed himself with a veto power over all IGC decisions and
appointments. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal
of the Iraq Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 327, 352-53 (2005); Gregory
H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 206 (2005); Kristen A.
Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695,695 (2004); Associated Press, Bremer Suggests US May
Block Islamic Law in Iraq, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2004, 3:22 AM), available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-02-l 6-islam-law_ x.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (reporting that amid speculations that the IGC could act
independently and exercise legislative authority, Bremer remarked that "it can't be
law until I sign it."); Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq:
Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269,
270 (2005) (Iraqi Ambassador to the UN accentuating that "nothing became law in
Iraq unless it was signed by ... Bremmer. ... It was the Civil Administrator, not the
IGC, who had the power to legislate.") (citing S.C. Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003));
SIGIR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS fN HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 11
(Jan. 2006) ("[The] CPA was the de facto government of Iraq that oversaw the
reestablishment of Iraqi ministries, consulted with an advisory 'legislature,'
promulgated laws and regulations, provided diplomatic links with foreign
governments, and coordinated with the coalition's military leadership."). The
CPA's authority over local Iraqi interests was recognized in Security Council
Resolutions, but the resolution did not permit unilaterally dictating Iraqi political
choices and laws. S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl. (May 22, 2003) (U.S. and U.K. were
represented as "the Authority"). Also, the General Accounting Office noted that the
"CPA assigned U.S. advisors from various agencies, including the Department of
State and the Department of Defense, to work directly with the Iraqi interim minister
appointed by the Governing Council. According to a former senior advisor, the
advisor had broad managerial authority, including the authority to hire and fire
ministry employees, determine ministry budgets, change ministry structures and
functions and make policy decisions." U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (GAO),
GA0-04-902R, REBUILDfNG IRAQ: RESOURCE, SECURITY, GOVERNANCE,
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knows" that unilaterally imposing economic agendas, locking in rules
that could foster economic and political distress, and shaping the
dynamics of new property rights were required before the Iraqi people
could choose legal institutions and socioeconomic change for
themselves. 94 Nonetheless, the CPA did wrongfully dictate 95 an open
capitalist economic system on Iraqis 96 and decrees were not only
inconsistent with Iraqi tradition, culture, and morals, 97 but also
originated from an even more coercive process than the milieu of
pressures that dominant states had placed on other states to quickly
adopt laissez faire practices and which periodically erupted into
societal dissent throughout the developing world. 98 The CPA
dramatized the existence of failings in bedrock Iraqi institutions as the
basis for contending that institutional transformations were imperative
to countenance a market economy, but in fact the first and foremost
infrastructure necessary for a market economy is effective contract
and property rights institutions, which were contained in the Iraqi
Civil Code, but the CPA did not modify the Civil Code. 99 The Iraqi
ESSENTIAL SERVICES, AND OVERSIGHT ISSUES 75 (2004).
94. Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of
Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT' L L. 431, 443 (2005); David Harvey,
Political and Economic Dimensions of Free Trade: Neobalism as Creative
Destruction, 610 ANNALS 22, 25 (2007) (reporting that an Iraqi member of the CPA
protested the forced imposition of "free market fundamentalism" as "a flawed logic
that ignores history").
95. James Gallen, Jus Post Bel/um: An Interpretive Framework, in Jus POST
BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATION 58, 62 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer
S. Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014) (stating that occupation law was "designed
to be palliative, such that major issues or redistribution of land or legal rights would
take place in a peace agreement that would end the occupation and regularize the
situation").
96. Harvey, supra note 94, at 25-26; ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN
EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 88 (2002) (stating
generally that American capital "movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas"
create an "integrated international order conducive to American interests, governed
by American norms, regulated by American power, and, above all, satisfying the
expectations of the American people for ever-greater abundance."); Naomi Klein,
Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia, HARPER'S (Sept.
2004) (noting that the CPA policies were ideologically neoconservative).
97. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative
Process and State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 523, 543 (2007) (explaining that Iraq and other Islamic countries have had
traditional and cultural traits that have regarded usury practices and exploitive
capitalism akin to thievery).
98. See generally OSWALDO DE RIVERO, THE MYTH OF DEVELOPMENT: THE
NON-VIABLE ECONOMICS OF THE 21st CENTURY (2001).
99. See Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The "Organic
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Civil Code fully comported with Western notions of property
ownership and an owner's absolute right to dispose, use, and exploit
property. 100 The CPA was more concerned with adopting new bodies
of law that would structure unconstrained capitalism, oblige foreign
investment, and urge for privatization of public assets.
Accordant with the archetypical advice rendered by BWis, in
June 2003, Bremer began announcing that Iraq possessed bloated,
inefficient, and unsustainable state enterprises as a justification for
privatization. 101 On September 19, 2003, Bremer promulgated four
orders that included "the full privatization of public enterprises, full
ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation
of foreign profits ... the opening of Iraq's banks to foreign control,
national treatment for foreign companies and . . . the elimination of
nearly all trade barriers." 102 However, it is not clear that the appointed
and impotent members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) ever
officially ratified any of the CPA's open market reforms. 103 The IGC
later expressed that members unanimously rejected the CPA' s

Minimalist" Approach to Legal Reconstruction, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, n.231 (2007).
100. Civil Code of 1990 art. 1048-49 (Iraq); see also Dan E. Stigall, A Closer
Look at Iraqi Property and Tort Law, 68 LA. L. REV. 765, 772-73, 788 (2008).
During the 1980s, Iraq followed liberalization and privatization simultaneously,
which included the government privatizing agricultural land that reduced holdings
from 50% public ownership during the mid-1980s to only 12% by 1989, and Iraq
privatized seventy large construction, mineral extraction, and food processing
factories. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, Economic Liberalization and the Lineage of the
Rentier State, 27 COMP. POL. 1, 8 (1994).
101. Looney, supra note 38, at 574.
A fundamental component of this process will be to force state-owned enterprises to
face hard budget constraints by reducing subsides and special deals . .. Iraq will no
doubt find that opening its borders to trade and investment will increase competitive
pressure on its domestic firms and thereby raise productivity.

Id. (citing Edmund Andrews, Overseer in Iraq Vows to Sell-OjJGovernment-Owned
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2003, at A13).
102. Harvey, supra note 94, at 25; see also Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2328.
103. Audi, supra note 48, at 355 (noting that Kamel Al-Gailani, the CPAappointed Iraqi Minister of Finance, publicly reiterated the series of changes that
would be made to Iraq's foreign investment laws).
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privatization program, 104 but the CPA pushed forward with the
privatization agenda. 105
Two months later, Bush appointed Thomas Foley, his 2000
election campaign chairman and a Harvard Business School
colleague, 106 for the mission of privatizing over two hundred stateowned industries, including chemical, mmmg, and cement
companies. 107 Assets owned by the state, on behalf of the people,
would be relinquished through a large-scale privatization process, 108
but the program was placed on hold. 109 Instead, on May 1, 2004, CPA
Order 76 was adopted and stated that State Owned Enterprises
("SOEs") would be transferred to Iraqi ministries and that the
enterprises "shall no longer have a separate legal identity and shall
cease to exist" after the transfer. 110 SOEs were placed under the
control of Ministry heads who were CPA appointees and who
possessed the authority to control the ministries and the budgets, set
policy, hire and fire ministry employees, 111 and ultimately, pursuant
to Order 76, to consolidate, merge, or sell SOEs. 112 Years later, but
still while under the U.S. military occupation, Maliki's dictatorial
104. Klein, supra note 96. Bremer met with Iraqi Communications Minister
Haider al-Abadi and Minister of Industry Mohamad Tafiq and al-Abadi recalls of
this meeting: "I said, 'Look, we don't have the mandate to do any of this.
Privatization is a big thing. We have to wait until there is an Iraqi government." Id.
Tafiq stated even more directly: "I am not going to do something that is not legal,
so that's it." Id.
105. Bali, supra note 94, at 442-43.
106. Thomas B. Edsall & Juliet Eilperin, Lobbyists Set Sights on MoneyMaking Opportunities in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2003, at A21.
107. Id.
108. See ZACHARY SHORE, BLUNDER: WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BAD
DECISIONS 206 (2008) (discussing comments by Foley allegedly stating that he did
not care about international law restrictions but he instead promised the President
that he intended to privatize all of Iraq's SOEs within 30 days); GRANDIN, supra
note 77, at 159; Klein, supra note 96.
109. Paul Krugman, Who Lost Iraq?, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2004), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/opinion/who-lost-iraq.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2015).
110. Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises Order No. 76 of 2004 § 4
(CPA, Iraq).
111. GAO, supra note 93, at 75("[The] CPA assigned U.S. advisors from
various agencies, including the Department of State and the Department of Defense,
to work directly with the Iraqi interim minister appointed by the Governing Council.
According to a former senior advisor, the advisors had broad managerial authority,
including the authority to hire and fire ministry employees, determine ministry
budgets, change ministry structures and functions and make policy decisions.
112. Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 110, § 4.
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government 113 announced plans to privatize over two hundred SOEs
over the next three to four years. 114 The institutional framework to
promote privatization and to maintain the CPA' s legal reforms had
been set before the CPA dissolved.
Antonia Juhasz succinctly described what unfolded and how
the new laws were adopted and enforced before there was an elected
government to approve of the laws. 115 The CPA referred to directives
as a single codified source of foundational law, referred to as
"Transitional Administrative Law" ("TAL"), 116 which had a
potentially permanent effect because of the inordinate procedures
required of a future Iraqi government to scrap the TAL:
Laws governing banking, investment, patents, copyrights, business
ownership, taxes, the media and trade have all been changed according
to U.S. goals, with little real participation from the Iraqi people .... The
TAL [laws] can be changed, but only with a two-thirds majority vote in
the National Assembly, and with the approval of the prime minister, the
president and both vice presidents. . . . The constitutional drafting
committee has, in tum, left each of these laws in place. 117

113. Al-Ali, supra note 30 (expressing that Maliki has alienated both Kurds and
Sunnis, been corrupt, deemed himself the "preeminent military leader," dispatched
security services to suppress peaceful protests by calling protestors "terrorists," hired
thugs to beat and kill dissenters, and had security services arrest and torture
dissenters until protests ended); Damon & Tawfeeq, supra note 30 (stating that Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlag expressed to CNN that he was "shocked" to
witness President Barack Obama address Maliki as "the elected leader of a
sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq," when Maliki had been ignoring powersharing institutions and when the US left Iraq "with a dictator" who systematically
suppresses dissent with impunity).
114. Charlie Welsh & PK Semler, Iraq Government to Restructure and
Privatize Some 200 Industrial Companies, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010, 8: 15 AM),
available
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d0b9b9fe-dlel-1 ldf-965c00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CwbtUjaZ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
115. See generally Antonia Juhasz, Bush's Economic Invasion of Iraq, L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2005),
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/l4/opinion/oe-juhasz14 (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
116. Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2329-30 (noting that the TAL was even to be
regarded as Iraq's interim constitution, suggesting that it should take precedence
over all other law); Note, Democracy in Iraq: Representation Through Ratification,
199 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2006).
117. Juhasz, supra note 115. Yet, at the time TAL proposals were launched, it
was only intended to remain in effect until an elected government took office
(nation-wide elections were scheduled for January 31, 2005).
Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of Mar. 8, 2004 art.
2 (CPA, Iraq). Then, in the same law, it states that the laws would "remain in force
until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force oflaw."
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The CPA codifications were also validated by the CPA' s final
order (Order 100), which replaced "the names of new Iraqi institutions
and officials for those of the CPA" in order to "protect the [CPA]
The CPA included language to
reforms into the future." 118
mendaciously designate that the reforms were the product of Iraqi
government institutions. 119 Lawyers and foreign officials warned that
Security Council Resolution 1483 only authorized the occupation to
"administrate," that the Hague Regulations of 1907 prevented the
occupation from altering the laws of the occupied country, and that the
reforms could be annulled. 120 Not one word in Resolution 1483
See id. art. 26( c ). Theories that have permitted overruling foreign occupation
dictates in the past have included asserting that the laws were not consistent with
international law (i.e. the doctrine of postliminy) or that the occupier exceeded its
See generally ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL
authority.
ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATIONS 145-50 (1942); ROLAND R.
FOULKE, 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LA w 289-90 ( 1920). This could have
been a justification vis-a-vis foreign interests and might have reversed illegally
attained property rights, but new codifications can change the law.
118. Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2332 (citing Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of
Iraq, G36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 245 (2005)).
119. Bali, supra note 94, at 435 (noting that the CPA's occupation strategy is a
"use of local proxies [the IGC and then the Interim Government] to attenuate its
direct administration of Iraq by force."); see also Bartram S. Brown, Intervention,
Self-Determination, Democracy and the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying
Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 23, 43-44 (2004). To assume that
Iraqis favored and chose institutions without knowing anything about them or that
the impotent CPA interim authority appointees could somehow legitimately assent
on behalf of Iraqis is foolish. Nonetheless, the rules were bestowed with a robust
effect as T AL.
120. Gathii, supra note 36, at 736 ("It is scarcely arguable that the powers
exercised by the CPA in signing privatization contracts lacked legitimacy among a
broad range oflraqis and potentially may be subject to reversal by a post-occupation
Iraqi regime ... "); Audi, supra note 48, at 336, 353 (stating that major economic
reforms imposed by the CPA could be deemed invalid under international law and
could be subject to reversal); Klein, supra note 96 (remarking that a future Iraqi
government could declare Bremer's orders illegal and foreign companies could have
investments nullified). Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, arts 3, 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague
Regulations] (stating that the occupier must "respect[], unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country" and that breaches make the occupier "liable to pay
compensation."); see Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 47-54, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (stating the importance to disseminating the Conventions rules
and that those in breach are to be penalized). See generally Bali, supra note 94, at
439-40, 466-67. States and the Security Council required the US and UK to adhere
to Geneva and Hague law. S.C. Res. 1472, 1 (Mar. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1483,
5; U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg. , U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726
supra note 93,
(Mar. 26, 2003); U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4732d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4732 (Mar.
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referred to sanctioning the occupying "Authority" or any faction of the
occupation to engage in any semblance of "legislating." 121 In the
seven times that the Security Council Resolution refers to
"institutions" and law-making initiatives
the language is
circumscribed by affirmations that the Iraqi people will determine
their "own political future" and that all U .N. members, U .N. organs,
and "the Authority," which was the U.S. and U.K., were sanctioned to
assist Iraqis in establishing their own institutions. 122
With respect to the CPA's attempted privatization agenda, it is
true that colonial powers confiscated property and governed over
foreign lands due to the ability to subjugate in conquest, 123 but
intemational laws 124 and U.S. Supreme Court precedent have rebuked
this norm. 125 Restrictions prohibit the occupier from appropriating
28, 2003).
121. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,, 5.
122. See id.,, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c), 8(i), 9.
123. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587, 590-95 (1823) (holding that
conquest and discovery legitimated title over lands previously inhabited by Native
Americans and because they lived in "tribes," incapable of governing themselves,
and attained "subsistence ... chiefly from the forest"); see Bejesky, Currency
Cooperation, supra note 59, at 143-44; James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and Other
Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and
Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 491, 496-97 (2004) ("[T]he
extinction of private property rights and contracts upon conquest is ... a systemic
expression of the hegemonic power of conquering states that goes back decades in
the history of international law.").
124. See Hague Regulations, supra note 120, art. 46. ("Private property cannot
be confiscated"); Bejesky, Currency Cooperation, supra note 59, at 138, 149, 155
(noting that decolonization has particularly served as a basis for upholding the right
of sovereign self-determination).
125. Early US Supreme Court cases emphasized the right of locals to expel a
foreign aggressor and confiscate the aggressor's property. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
199, 226 ( 1796) (holding that in expelling the British from American borders,
"enemies, by every right, may be plundered, and seized upon" and that "whatever
effects of the enemy are found with us who are his enemy, should change their
master, and be confiscated, or go into the treasury"); see Miller v. United States, 78
U.S. 268, 304-05 (1870) (upholding the power of confiscation as a legal sovereign
act pursuant to Congress's authority to declare and prosecute war); see also Haycraft
v. United States, 89 U.S. 81, 94 (1874); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 51
(1833) ("Even in cases of conquest, it is very unusual for the conqueror to do more
than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern
usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and
of right, which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world, would be
outraged; if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights
annulled."). Legislation upholding confiscation was also enacted during the Civil
War as both the Confederate government and Congress passed retaliatory legislation
permitting confiscation of enemy property. James G. Randall, Captured and
Abandoned Property During the Civil War, 19 AM. HIST. REV. 65, 65 (1913).
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private property and public assets of the occupied population. The
Hague Regulations state that an occupying power can "take
possession" of assets temporarily but cannot sell or transfer ownership
of the property. 126 Article 55 explicitly addresses public property
rights when it affirms that the occupying power "shall be regarded as
an administrator and usufructuary" of public assets and that the
occupier must "safeguard the capital of these properties, and
administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct." 127 Article
53 of the Geneva Convention states that "[a]ny destruction by the
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually
or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public
authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is
prohibited ... " 128 With the explicit language incorporated into these
Another example is the seizure of foreign vessels on the high seas when ships were
suspected of piracy or involvement in supporting an enemy. Act of June 24, 1795,
1 Stat. 572 (authorizing the defense of U.S. merchant vessels against French
depredations)
126. Hague Regulations, supra note 120, art. 53, 55; see Eyal Benvenisti &
Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian
Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295,313 (1995).
127. Hague Relations, supra note 120, art. 55 (emphasis added) (listing public
assets that include "public buildings, real estate, forests and agricultural estates
belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country."); see also
Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bel/um and the
Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers, 50 McGILL L.J. 285, 304-05
(2005); R. Dobie Langenkamp & Rex J. Zedalis, What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?:

Thoughts on Some Significant, Unexamined International Legal Questions
Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 417, 432-33 (2003)
(suggesting that an occupying power might appoint a private firm to temporarily
manage public property or state-owned industry if the occupier does not have a selfenrichment intention and the appointment is in good faith and is economically
sound).
128. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]. During the 1949 diplomatic conference, which led to the
adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the US, UK, and Canada had no qualms
with protecting private property from pillage but claimed that there was no basis for
protecting public property owned by a defeated state and even maintained that
victorious armies should be able to take government property to pay off debts. Lea
Brilmayer & Geoffrey Chepiga, Ownership or Use? Civilian Property Interests in
International Humanitarian Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 413, 425-26 (2008).
Alternatively, the Soviet Union and China contended that "the destruction of [State]
property affected not only the interests of the State but also those of individuals"
since civilians relied on state-owned property for sustenance; the socialist
governments contended that all tvoes of orooertv should be orotected during
warfare. Id. at 425-26 (citing 2A Final Record of the Diolomatic Conference
Convened bv the Swiss Federal Council for the Establishment of International
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims and Held at Geneva from April 21st
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prohibitions, the CPA's blatant hypocrisy, after devising a program
and attempting to sell off SOEs, is encountered in Article 16 of the
CPA's TAL, which states: "Public property is sacrosanct, and its
protection is the duty of every citizen." 129
B. Foreign Investment

Historical occupations with exploitive intentions have been
condemned, 130 but even if the occupier does not possess a profiteering
motive, codification of new investment rules can transfer domestic
resources to foreign interests 131 and produce domestic economic
winners and losers. 132 Beneficiaries are apt to soundly support
reforms and the foreign entities ostensibly correlated to that fortuity, 133
while the disenfranchised will be hostile to the reforms, feel politically
ostracized, 134 and be distinctly unwilling to assent to a foreign power
unilaterally dictating new laws.
to August 12th, 1949, at 649 (2004)).
129. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,
supra note 117, art. 16. The CPA did take Ba' ath party assets and recognized public
assets on behalf of the people of Iraq. Management of Property and Assets of the
Iraqi Baath Party Order No. 4 of 2003 § 3(1)-(3) (CPA, Iraq) (dictating that all
property and assets of the Baath Party were to be seized and transferred to the CPA
"for the benefit of the people of Iraq"). Given the circumstance, this order was
probably not controversial.
130. Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again:
The Role of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International Trusteeship,
and the Framework of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT' L
& COMP. L. REV. 85, 97 (2009).
131. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 89 (3d ed. 2010).
132. Judith S. Kullberg & William Zimmerman, Liberal Elites, Socialist
Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy, 51 WORLD POL. 323, 324 (1999)
(writing of polls several years into the Russian reforms and noting that elites liked
the system because "[ s]upport for liberalism is causally related to the ability of
individuals to participate in the new economic order: those who are 'locked out' of
the new economy and are constrained by circumstances and context from improving
their conditions will be more likely to express antiliberal values and attitudes," but
only a small segment of the Russian population dramatically benefited with the fall
of the socialist economy, but a majority of the Russian population has been harmed).
133. A percentage of the domestic polity will support capitalist reforms and
multinational corporations, particularly those segments that perceive that they will
be better off as a result of open market laws or those sectors that assimilate an
ideology of favoring the foreign authority or its new economic laws. However, the
level of popular support at the time new laws were adopted was likely weak.
134. See Duncan Kennedy, Shock and Awe Meets Market Shock, BOSTON REV.
(Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.bostonreview.net/world/duncan-kennedyshock-and-awe-meets-market-shock (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (listing the
capitalist reforms applied to Iraq and noting that "[ e ]conomic development is a
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Unlike Iraq, countries possessing actual sovereignty, selfdetermination, and a voiced citizenry have adopted assorted
investment vehicles to protect domestic interests 135 and have chosen
gradualist approaches to liberalization and foreign investment, but the
CPA passed Order 39, a six-page law, that "replace[d] all existing
foreign investment law" and opened up "all economic sectors in Iraq,
except ... natural resources" to complete foreign ownership. 136 Order
39 endowed investors with the right to take a 100% ownership interest
in Iraqi enterprises or sectors, required no obligation to partner with or
structure joint ventures with Iraqi businesses, 137 and bestowed a rare
privilege of plenary "national treatment" so that foreign investors
could not be subject to discrimination and would, by law, be treated as
domestic businesses. 138 Despite the fact that it was a CPA directive,
section 2 provides: "This Order promotes and safeguards the general
welfare and interest of the Iraqi people by promoting foreign
investment through the protection of the rights and property of foreign
investors in Iraq and the regulation through transparent processes of
matters relating to foreign investment in Iraq." 139
The CPA' s omnipotence was again on display with CPA Order
39's categorical certification that the CPA knew Iraqi desires, despite
the fact that Iraqis did not select the initiatives or the appropriate role
for foreign investment. In fact, local Iraqi businessmen began
expressing shortly after the invasion that they were excluded from the
political process and that they would be unable to compete with
foreign businesses that moved to Iraq, 140 but the Bush administration
dynamic process in which small initial disadvantages often translate into massive
permanent inequalities").
135. See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 131, at 97-99. The three main
vehicles for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are Greenfield investments, mergers
and acquisitions, and joint ventures, and the details of ownership and applicability
of taxation, licensing requirements, and other applicable regulations are determined
by local laws and relations with local government officials.
136. Foreign Investment Law Order No. 39 of2003 §§ 3, 6 (CPA, Iraq); Bali,
supra note 94, at 442; Audi, supra note 48, at 346-47.
137. See Foreign Investment Law, supra note 136, § 7.
138. Id. § 4 (stating that foreign businesses were "entitled to make foreign
investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi
investor"); Bali, supra note 94, at 442 (noting that very few countries permit absolute
national treatment for foreign business entities).
139. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 136, § 2.
140. See Falsafi, supra note 86, at 425 (stating that labor unions suffered in Iraq
because the occupation and the new Iraqi government used violence to suppress
labor leaders, which is indicative of"the Bush Administration's disdain for workers'
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pushed for an intense implementation of Order 39 by declaring that
Iraq was "Open for Business" 141 and by initiating programs inside the
U.S. that urged American corporations to invest in operations in
Iraq. 142 Political patrons of the Bush administration were reportedly
directly involved in their own rent seeking activities in Iraq following
None of this was serendipitous; the Bush
the invasion. 143
administration specifically planned for and sponsored such reforms
with the two thousand page White House Future of Iraq Project,
which was led by select Iraqi defectors and U.S. government officials
who were impaneled for the operations in early 2002, over a year
before the invasion. 144
rights, as demonstrated by its aggressive support for oppressive labor laws," and the
weak status of labor unions at the time of the invasion); see also Timothy Mills,
Panel Response, Panel 3: The Development ofa Market Democracy, 33 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 195, 196 (2004) (remarking about the author's thirteen trips to Baghdad
and meeting with Iraqi businessmen, political leaders, and former government
officials, and explaining that stakeholders complained that they were excluded from
the political process); Jeff Madrick, An Extreme Plan for Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2003 ), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 10/02/business/02SCEN .html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (stating that the CPA reforms "immediately make Iraq's
economy one of the most open to trade and capital flows in the world, and put it
among the lowest taxed in the world, rich or poor"). Moreover, the adverse
consequences of a rapid and deep foreign investment policy could include a higher
unemployment rate and a difficulty in competing with cash-endowed and
experienced multinationals.
141. Boon, supra note 48, at 533.
142. See generally IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS IN IRAQ: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2003);
GRANDIN, supra note 77, at 261 n.2, (citing Naomi Klein, Risky Business, NATION,
Jan. 5, 2004) (reporting that the Bush administration offered sub-market price
corporate insurance to American companies through the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation to further reduce the risk of launching business operations
in Iraq).
143. Douglas Jehl, Washington Insiders' New Firm Consults on Contracts in
Iraq,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/30/politics/30LOBB.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2015) (stating that a group of businessmen, lobbyists, and former assistants to Bush
and his father established New Bridge Strategies, a firm that boasts of"being created
specifically with the aim of assisting clients to evaluate and take advantage of
business opportunities in the Middle East following the conclusion of the U.S.-led
war in Iraq"). The founder, Joe Allbaugh, former Bush-Cheney campaign manager,
remarked: "Getting the rights to distribute Proctor & Gamble products can be a gold
mine ... One well-stocked 7-Eleven could knock out thirty Iraqi stores; a Wal-Mart
could take over the country." Klein, supra note 96.
144. Farrah Hassan, New State Department Releases on the "Future of Iraq"
NAT'L
SEC.
ARCHIVE
(Sept.
1,
2006),
available
at
Project,
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 198/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015); see also Erick Schmitt & Joel Brinkley, The Struggle for Iraq:
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CPA Administrator Bremer announced that foreign firms
doing business in Iraq would receive 15% to 45% tax breaks 145 and
the CPA dropped the top Iraqi corporate tax bracket to 15%, when the
pre-invasion rate was 40%. 146 Without restrictions on foreign
investment or business operations, U.S. corporations had a pecuniary
motive to shift certain operations to Iraq and lower the U.S. tax bill. 147
The Wall Street Journal explained that new laws, with virtually no
restriction on foreign investment or movement of capital, made Iraq's
economy "one of the most open to trade and capital flows in the world,
and put it among the lowest taxed in the world, rich or poor." 148
Professor Greg Grandin explained the impact of resource shifting:
"[T]he US occupation has imposed on Iraq a massive [U.S.]
intervention on behalf of multinationals, insured by US taxpayers and
subsidized by the US defense budget." 149
Many foreign corporations reaped staggering profits, 150
particularly entities associated with the U.S. military-industrial

Planning; State Dept. Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/world/struggle-for-iraqplanning-state-dept-study-foresaw-troub le-now-p laguing-iraq .html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015) (stating that the 13 volumes and over 2,000 pages of the Future of
Iraq Project was not released until "several House and Senate committees" had
requested them).
145. Klein, supra note 57, at 340.
146. Tax Strategy Law Order No. 49 of 2004 explanatory note (CPA, Iraq); see
also Tax Strategy Law Order No. 37 of2003 § 4 (CPA, Iraq); ARNOVE, supra note
85, at 17.
147. For example, existing business operations could be commingled (as
opposed to new operations that may not have been undertaken "but for" Iraq's new
laws) and this opportunity could impact the income statement of US companies or
reduce the U.S. tax bill if profits were retained in offshore accounts. See Joshua
Smith & Thomas L. Hungerford, Cutting Tax Rates Not the Answer: Opposing View,
USA
TODAY
(May
1,
2014,
8:20
PM),
available
at
http://www. usatoda y. com/story/opinion/2014/05/01 /pfizer-corporate-taxeconomic-policy-institute-editorials-debates/8583 713/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
See
also,
Corporate
Tax
Rates
Table,
KPMG,
available
at
https ://home.kpmg. com/xx/en/home/ services/tax/tax-too ls-and-resources/tax -ratesonline/corporate-tax-rates-tab le.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
148. Madrick, supra note 84; see also Kennedy, supra note 134 (noting the
Washington Consensus prescriptions on Iraq and the interest in foreign investment
if MN Cs expect highly profitable returns and an ability to remove profits from the
country).
149. GRANDIN, supra note 77, at 159-60.
150. Bali, supra note 94, at 443.
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complex, 151 and there was no constraint on repatriation of profits. 152
The system of corporate benefit was called "war profiteering," 153 but
apparently from the perspective of the Bush administration, negative
reverberations were regarded as inconsequential or legitimate
consequences of the CPA' s economic ultimatums. Professor Gathii
remarks:
In seeking to remake Iraq into the most idealistic type of free market
economy, the United States has placed the interests of its leading
multinational corporations at the forefront in transforming public and
private wealth into engines of new profit for the United States. Thus,
the apparently enlightened occupier mission of ending a dictatorial
regime by replacing it with idealistic visions of free markets and liberal
democracy may be nothing more than an excuse to legitimate new
forms of oppression in Iraq. 154

Order 39 and the CPA's attempted privatization agenda were
overwhelming rejected by Iraqis, including by members of the IGC at
the time of adoption, 155 and Order 39 could have been perceived as a
violation of international law because the Hague Regulations mandate
occupying powers to protect, safeguard, and administer the occupied
territory in accordance with the rules of usufruct. 156 Nonetheless, the
151. CONRAD MOLDEN, WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR
CONTRACTS?: FROM EISENHOWER'S WARNINGS TO HALLIBURTON'S PROFITS 11-12
(2012).
152. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 136, art. 7(2)(d) (investors can
"transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment,"
including profits and sale of the foreign investment); GRANDIN, supra note 77, at
159 ( stating that foreign corporations were given the right to "unlimited repatriation
of profits"); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws
of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 615 (2006) (stating that Order
No. 39 did not require reinvesting profits into the country).
153. See Kevin J. Wilkinson, More Effective Procurement Response to
Disasters: Maximizing the Extraordinary Flexibilities ofIDIQ Contracting, 59 A.F.
L. REV. 231,240 (2007).
154. Gathii, supra note 123, at 512-13.
155. See id. at 736; see also Audi, supra note 48, at 355; Chip Cummins, StateRun Oil Company Is Being Weighed for Iraq, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2004, 11 :37 PM),
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107343427082371300 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015) (stating that there are "political sensitivities about foreign
interference in the oil sector" and that the intentions of Iraq's leaders have inflamed
many inside Iraq).
156. Hague Regulations, supra note 120, art. 55; Naomi Klein, Bring
Halliburton
Home,
NATION
(Nov.
6,
2003),
available
at
http://www.thenation.com/article/bring-halliburton-home (last visited Nov. 22,
2015) (stating that Bremer's reforms were illegal with the Security Council
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foreign profiteering still occurred and TAL provisions were still
operative after the CPA dissolved. Granted, overturning TAL
provisions would have been conceivable through legislative reform
(after a two-thirds vote of parliament and the authorization of the
cabinet), 157 judicial processes, or systematic transnational public law
litigation, 158 but invalidating or materially altering the occupation's
institutions and influence can become more difficult after a new status
quo has been set, the foreign military enforces the occupation, new
rights become entrenched, and more time passes, 159 particularly when
Iraqis were more concerned with survival during civil war-like
conditions than with overturning CPA ultimatums. 160 Property rights
can be directly enforceable and may have permanence by socialization
and the advocacy interests of new respective owners and similarly
situated stakeholders.
C. Constitutionally Locking in Reforms

International law and Iraqi law could have permitted
overturning CPA reforms and imposing liability, 161 but these rights
specifying the applicability of The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions).
157. Juhasz, supra note 115.
158. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation,
100 YALE L. J. 2347 (1991); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco,
Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 2002 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (1991).
159. Bali, supra note 94, at 443. Order 39 was repealed, but, while still under
occupation, the new Iraqi government enacted a National Investment Law that
provided a tax free status for U.S. foreign direct investment in Iraq. Iraq MPs Pass
Law to Encourage Foreign Investment, FINANZNACHRICHTEN (Oct. 10, 2006, 5:10
PM), available at http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2006-10/7117497iraq-mps-pass-law-to-encourage-foreign-investment-020.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
160. One can assuredly remonstrate that there was a representative government
at the time the Constitution was adopted, which means that Iraqi democratic will
could have curbed disputatious provisions from being incorporated into the
Constitution, but one can also rebut that the Iraqi public intention was probably more
transfixed on survival as the country was consumed by violence and near-civil war
conditions. See generally Robert Bejesky, A Ripe Foundation for the Formation of
ISIS: Tit-for-Tat Hostilities and Contingently Contained Violence (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Syracuse Journal oflnternational Law and Commerce).
161. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 128, art. 47 (providing that
occupied inhabitants are protected and "shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change
introduced, as a result of the occupation"); Law of Administration, supra note 117,
art. 22 ("If, in the course of his work, an official of any government office ... or the
local administrations, deprives an individual or a group of the rights guaranteed by
this Law or any other Iraqi laws in force, this individual or group shall have the right
to maintain a cause of action."); Theodore W. Kassinger & Dylan J. Williams,
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can be pitted against other constitutional rights and interests. 162 Iraq's
constitutional provisions, which were actually predominately
embodied in the CPA's TAL, were later codified in the Iraqi
Constitution with notable U.S. exhortation. 163
Provisions governing economic activity and ordering are
explicit in the Iraqi Constitution even though many of the principles
would normally comprise interpretable policy issues in consolidated
democracies. 164 Article 25 of the Iraqi Constitution affirms that the
"State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance
with modem economic principles to insure full investment of its
resources, diversification of its sources, and the encouragement and
development of the private sector." 165 Article 26 accentuates that the
"State shall guarantee the encouragement of investment in the various
sectors, and this shall be regulated by law." 166 Article 23, when
viewed in conjunction with restrictions on expropriation and
protection for property rights 167 and "national treatment" laws,
incorporates commanding protection for foreign investment. These
provisions that sanctify capitalism and private sector investment, are
included under "Section Two: Rights and Liberties" of the Iraqi
Commercial Law Reform Issues in the Reconstruction of Iraq, 33 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 217, 218 (2004) (stating that the Geneva rules are customary international
law and have been signed by all parties involved).
162. Article 44, Dustur Jumhuriyat al-'Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of2005 ("There may not be a restriction or limit on the practice of any rights
or liberties in this constitution, except by law or on the basis of it, and insofar as that
limitation or restriction does not violates the essence of the right or freedom.").
163. Robert Bejesky, CPA Dictates on Iraq: Not an Update to the Customary
International Law of Occupation but the Nucleus of Blowback with the Emergence
of ISIS, 42 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 273, 305-06 (2015).
164. For example, there is a drastic distinction in the language of the US
Constitution which does sanctify "property rights," but only in Amendment V,
which only applies to government expropriation. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No
person shall be ... deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
165. Article 25, Dustur Jumhuriyat al- 'Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of 2005.
166. Id. art. 26.
167. See id. art. 23 ("Private property is protected .... Expropriation is not
permissible except for the purposes of public benefit in return for just compensation,
and this shall be regulated by law."). International law seemingly requires fair value
for expropriation, but there has been disagreement over measuring compensation.
See G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 2, § 2(c) (Dec. 12, 1974) (emphasizing precedent
for the freedom of nationalization and expropriation and that compensation is freely
assessed domestically as a principle of sovereignty). See generally SORNARAJAH,
supra note 131, at 414-18.
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Constitution and are perversely comingled with other rights, such as
the right to life, liberty, and political freedom, 168 as the supreme
foundational source oflaw and fundamental right, calculated to prevail
over subsequent legislative agendas. 169
Perhaps the most polemical progression and the one that was
pillared on the sequence of deepening reforms was the robust
advocacy to revamp Iraq's oil industry. Iraqi defectors and CPA
appointees offered periodic public statements endorsing privatization
of Iraq's nationalized oil industry 170 and this advocacy became a
source of evidence for those who contended that the Iraq War was
driven by interest in Iraqi oil. 171 Security Council Resolution 1546
affirmed "the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own
political future and control their own natural resources," 172 but Article
112 of the Iraqi Constitution states that the government "shall ...
formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas
168. See Articles 14-46, Dustur Jumhuriyat al-'Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005 (the articles that comprise "Section Two: Rights and
Liberties" of the Iraqi Constitution).
169. See id. art. 2 ("No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic
freedoms stipulated in this Constitution."): see. e.g... Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S.
137. 177 (1803) ("It is a proposition too plain to be contested. that the constitution
controls anv legislative act repugnant to it; or that the legislature may alter the
constitution by an ordinary act."); see Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy:
Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
707, 710 (2006) (discussing the binding nature of constitutional provisions to
"restrict the actions available to future politicians").
170. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 219, 229-32, 245, 249; see also
Sammy Ketz, Iraq's Planning Minister Wants to Slash Public Sector Worliforce,
at
available
AM),
12:00
2008,
10,
(Nov.
STAR
DAILY
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2008/Nov-10/82371-iraqsplanning-minster-wants-to-slash-public-sector-workforce.ashx#axzz3DXQ6vb1Z
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (noting that Ali Baban, Iraq's planning minister,
contended that the oil and other industries were entirely suitable for full
privatization).
171. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 209, 226-27. Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that "the Iraq war [was] largely about oil." Bob
Woodward, Greenspan: Ouster of Hussein Crucial for Oil Security, WASH. POST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpat
available
2007),
17,
(Sept.
dyn/content/article/2007 /09/l 6/AR200709160 l 287_pf.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2015). When asked to elucidate, Greenspan responded that Saddam Hussein's
"behavior" posed a threat to regional oil supplies. See Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi
Klein on the Iraq War, Bush's Tax Cuts, Economic Populism, Crony Capitalism and
2007),
24,
(Sept.
Now!
DEMOCRACY
More,
http://www.democracynow.org/2007 /9/24/alan_greenspan_vs_naomi_klein_ on
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015). Greenspan never described what that recent "behavior"
was in relation to the reasons for war.
172. S.C. Res. 1546, pmbl. (June 8, 2004).
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wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people
using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and
encouraging investment." 173 Given that Iraqis were cash poor because
of the state of their economy during the invasion and occupation,
"encouraging investment" by default presumably meant foreign
investment. Shortly after the invasion, American and British oil
conglomerates began to entrench themselves in Iraq but waited for
four years to finally procure official exploitation rights. 174 In a
December 2005 agreement with the IMF, Iraq committed itself to
drafting a new petroleum law by the end of 2006 so that foreign oil
companies could invest in Iraq. 175 By 2008, multinational oil
companies began to be recipients of long-term licenses to exploit Iraqi
oil fields through Production Sharing Agreements. 176 In 2013, CNN
reported, "[T]he Iraq War was a war for oil, and it was a war with
winners: Big Oil." 177

D. A Fine Example of the "Rule ofLaw": Dollarizing the Iraqi
Economy

The CPA may have been able to so handily dictate unbounded
capitalist reforms because of the practical and psychological
humanitarian dependence that stemmed from the CPA' s monetary
policy. The authority to manage an occupied country's financial,
commercial, and economic system is not authorized in the Hague
Regulations, 178 but the CPA initiated a system to provide liquidity to
173. Article 112, § 2, Dustur Jumhuriyat al-'Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic oflraq] of 2005.
174. See Mekay, supra note 63 (stating that there were hundreds of Americans
working in Iraqi government agencies and that they worked to give "full access for
U.S. companies to the nation's oil reserves").
175. Joshua Gallu, The Race For Iraq's Resources: Will Iraq 's Oil Blessing
Become a Curse?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 22, 2006, 3:46 PM), available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-race-for-iraq-s-resources-will-iraq-s-oilblessing-become-a-curse-a-456212.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). The Bush
administration was so interested that the USAID contracted with BearingPoint to
draft proposals for Iraq's new law. See generally BEARINGPOINT, OPTIONS FOR
DEVELOPING A LONG TERM SUSTAINABLE IRAQI OIL INDUSTRY (2003).
176. See Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 16, at 224-25, 240-41, 249-50 ..
177. Juhasz, supra note 25.
178. See JAMES A. TYNER, THE BUSINESS OF WAR: WORKERS, WARRIORS AND
HOSTAGES IN OCCUPIED IRAQ 82 (2006); see also LAURENCE BOISSON DE
CHAZOURNES, TAKING THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW SERIOUSLY: ECONOMIC
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the Iraqi economy by having the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank physically
transport U.S. currency to the CPA and inject the legal tender into the
Iraqi economy. 179 Most of the physical U.S. dollar transfers were
drawn from the Development Fund for Iraq ("DFI"), which the CPA
constituted and controlled 180 as the successor to the U.N. Oil for Food
Program. 181 By June 28, 2004, the date the CPA transferred authority
to the interim Iraqi government, U.S. officials had disbursed $20.7
billion into the Iraqi economy, of which $12 billion was provided in
cash, and some of those disbursements set records as the largest U.S.
Federal Reserve cash payouts in history. 182
The monetary value belonged to Iraqis, but the CPA
distributed U.S. dollars like a parent dispensing an allowance to a
child, 183 breeding a dependence on the currency for routine and
everyday transactions. 184 Iraq had three alternative circulating
currencies with different exchange rates, 185 but the high-value of crisp,
new U.S. hundred dollar bills bred frenzy and imparted a favorable
symbol of the occupation and likely made the U.S. dollar the de facto
currency, 186 which was a particularly ironic twist because Hussein's
11-12 (2005).
179. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff on Cash Transfers to the
Coalition Provisional Authority to the House of Representatives Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform 1 (Feb. 6, 2007) [hereinafter HR Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform].
180. See Hmoud, supra note 64, at 449-50.
181. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
1.
182. Id. at 1, 4, 5-6. Several of these shipments ($1.5 billion on Dec. 23, 2003,
$2.4 billion on June 18, 2003, and $1.6 billion on June 25, 2003) were the "largest
pay out[s] of U.S. currency in Fed history." Id. at 6-7.
183. See Mills, supra note 140, at 208 (US government funding salaries and
utility needs); Melissa Patterson, Who's Got the Title? Or, The Remnants of
Debellatio in Post-Invasion Iraq, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467,471 (2006).
184. CPA fiscal transactions may have set the groundwork for imposed reforms
and an open economy because transactions involving payment for government
salaries and goods and services rendered inside Iraq and payments to external
recipients could be made in US currency or denominated in US dollars for
international transactions.
185. New Iraqi Dinar Banknotes Law Order No. 43 of 2003 § 1 (CPA, Iraq)
(listing the "Swiss dinar" (1959-89), "1990 dinar," and the "New Iraqi dinar," all of
which had different "Official Conversion Rates" but that the goal was to get to only
using the "New Iraqi dinar").
186. CPA official Frank Willis testified to Congress and stated that a "'wild
west' atmosphere prevailed and the country was awash in brand new $100 bills."
HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at 13 (citing
Testimony of Frank Willis, An Oversight Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in
INSTRUMENTS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
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regime went off the U.S. dollar three years earlier as a hard currency
for denominating oil sales in favor of the Euro. 187 U.S. currency
represented buying power for the flood of new high-technology
gadgets and consumer goods, which were previously restricted
imports, not because of the lack of a currency, but because of sanctions
and poverty. 188
With the humanitarian disaster and lack of a tangible
commodity-backed or hard currency, the U.S. dollar's full faith and
credit served as the basis of currency stability. Alan Greenspan,
Federal Reserve Chairman at the time U.S. Federal Reserve payouts
were made, later remarked:
[W]hat we were involved in was essentially endeavoring to create a
viable currency for the Central Bank of Iraq. And what we did do was
- I think very successfully - create what is a viable financial system,
even under the circumstances that currently exist. There was, as far as
I can judge, a huge drain of the resources into areas that nobody to this
day can understand or follow. 189

U.S. Government Contracting in Iraq, Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Hearing (Feb. 14, 2005)). US $100 bills were juxtaposed with the comparatively
weak value of other currencies and symbolized Iraqi economic and social viability
when the country had been facing hardship. $100 bills served as a daily reminder of
the occupation (as the US dollar was the same currency used by the nation of the
occupying force) and more prosperity even though the standard of living could have
increased threefold overnight by simply dropping the restrictions on oil sales.
Likewise, there would also be an emotive psychological impact with currency
containing Saddam Hussein's image. By contrast, Iraqi banknotes, which were
denominated at a highest value of 250 Iraqi dinar, worth approximately sixteen
cents, required a "brick-like" stack of bills for purchasing daily necessities.
Hamoudi, supra note 97, at 531. The need to eliminate old currencies because of
their low value is predominantly due to the fact that Iraq's economy had been
destroyed for over a decade but was suddenly opened to international financial
transactions, currencies possess a foreign exchange value with an open economy,
there was purchasing power parity with international transactions, and the central
bank (under the direction of the current occupational authority) set monetary policy.
187. Faisal Islam, Iraq Nets Handsome Profit by Dumping Dollar for Euro,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
15,
2003,
8:55
PM),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/feb/ 16/iraq. theeuro (last visited Nov.
22, 2015).
188. Mills, supra note 140, at 204. While the imported products had long
existed, the drastic change in trade (under military occupation), may have made it
appear that it was the US that brought such opportunities.
189. "Mr. Greenspan is Flat Wrong": Pulitzer Prize-Winning Journalists
Respond to Alan Greenspan 's Claim that He Didn't Know About Federal Reserve 's
Role in Iraq's Missing Billions, DEMOCRACY Now! (Oct. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2007 /10/9/mr_greenspan_is_flat_ wrong_pulitzer
(last visited Dec. 1, 2015) Ambassador Timothy Carney remarked: "[A] capable
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Greenspan's reference to a "huge drain on the resources"
might have been attributable to the CPA's mode of cash distribution.
Both the U.N. resolution that created the DFI and CPA rules governing
the DFI specified that funds were required to be distributed "in a
transparent manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people ... and for other purposes benefiting the people oflraq." 190 At
the heart of congressional investigations in September 2007 was the
location of the Federal Reserve's $12 billion in physical cash
allocations after it was delivered to the CPA. 191 Congressional
investigations revealed that the CPA compensated recipients with
duffel bags stuffed with cash, that trucks carried off loads of cash, that
cash was stolen out of vaults, and that "ghost" employees were being
paid. 192
U .N. Resolution 1483 required that Iraq's funds be "audited by
[an approved] independent public accountant[]" 193 and CPA rule

U.S. Treasury team worked out an emergency scheme for [Iraqi] government
workers - and I became one of the deliverymen [for cash payments]. Without a
functioning banking system, cash was the only way to inject money into the
economy." HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179,
at 14.
190. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,, 14; see also S.C. Res. 1511, ,, 23-24
(Oct. 16, 2003) ("Emphasizes that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board
(IAMB) referred to in paragraph 12 ofresolution 1483 (2003) should be established
as a priority, and reiterates that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a
transparent manner as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1483 (2003)"); HR
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at 2
(emphasizing that CPA officials were fully cognizant that DFI funds were required
to be transferred in a transparent manner).
191. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
1; The Impact of CPA Decision making on Iraq Reconstruction: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov 't Reform, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) (noting that up
to $20 billion could have been unaccounted for).
192. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
2; see also id. at 2 ("The failure to account for the $20 billion expended by the CPA
appears to have had serious consequences. Many of the funds appear to have been
lost to corruption and waste. According to the Inspector General, thousands of
'ghost employees' were receiving paychecks from Iraqi ministries under CPA's
control."); Id. at 13 (reporting that Frank Willis testified that "when contractors
needed to be paid by the CPA, they were told to 'bring a big bag' for cash payment"
(citing Interview of Frank Willis, House Committee on Government Reform,
Minority Staff (Jan. 27, 2005)); SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ
RECONSTRUCTION, HARD LESSONS: THE IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE 155
(2009) ("CPA failed to enforce adequate management, financial, and contractual
controls over approximately $8.8 billion of DFI money.").
193. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,, 12.
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number 2 also stated that it would secure the "services of an
independent, certified public accounting firm." 194 The CPA did not
hire a "certified public accounting firm," 195 and post-occupation audits
discovered that there were hundreds of instances of inadequate
controls and disbursals to unverifiable recipients and for non-existent
contracts, contractors, and projects. 196 The Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction report remarked that "proper cash accountability was
not maintained, physical security was inadequate, fund agent records
were not complete, and fund managers' responsibilities and liabilities
were not properly assigned." 197
Billions of dollars in Iraqi public money, which the CPA was
required to allocate in a consuetude accordant with the fiduciary
obligations of an occupier, could not be accounted for. 198 There was
hypocrisy; federal criminal charges were filed against individuals
suspected of taking bribes and engaging in other criminal misconduct
while the U.N. administered the pre-2003 Oil for Food Program 199 and
194. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
10 (citing CPA, Regulation Number 2: Development Fund/or Iraq (June 10, 2003)).
195. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
11 (stating that the CPA did not hire "a certified public accounting firm," but instead
paid $1.4 million to a company called North Star Consultants that operated out of a
private residence in San Diego, and reporting that the Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction noted that North Star never performed this work). Bremer also,
through Regulation Number 3, created a Program Review Board, which was
required to report directly to Bremer, and be "responsible for recommending
expenditures of resources from the Development Fund for Iraq and other
resources ... " Program Review Board Regulation No. 3 of 2003 § 6 (CPA, Iraq).
196. SIGIR, REPORT NO. 05-004, AUDIT REPORT: OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS
PROVIDED TO IRAQI MINISTRIES THROUGH THE NATIONAL BUDGET PROCESS, 7 (Jan.
30, 2005) [hereinafter SIGIR, AUDIT REPORT].
197. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
13 (citing SIGIR, AUDIT REPORT).
198. HR Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at
18.
199. In 2005, U.S. officials initiated U.S. federal criminal charge investigations
against U.N. officials for criminal misconduct, including for accepting "bribes," in
the pre-2003 U.N. Secretary-General administered oil-for-food program. See John
R. Crook, Further U.S. Reactions to Abuses in UN Oil-for-Food Program; U.S.
Criminal Charges Against UN Officials, Others, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 904 (2005);
Russell P. McAleavey, Note, Pressuring Sudan: The Prospect of an Oil-For-Food
Program for Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1058, 1088-89 (2008). In November
2007, Chevron was ordered to pay $30 million in criminal and civil penalties for
kickbacks under the U.N. Oil for Food Program. See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion
Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - 1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 89, 108 (2010). For example, Aleksandr Yakovlev pied guilty to U.S. federal
charges of money laundering, conspiracy, and wire fraud for reportedly receiving
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the CPA created the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity that was
focused on investigating historical corruption of Hussein's regime, 200
but CPA officials overtly stated that they believed that their fiscal
obligations should be above reproach because their goal was to inject
money into the economy. 201 The CPA certainly should not have been
above reproach because investigations eventually led a former CPA
official to plead guilty to multiple felony counts for stealing millions
of dollars in cash. 202
Another predicament is that the CPA had just stripped
hundreds of thousands of employees out of the Iraqi government for
Ba'ath Party association and dismantled the Iraqi military apparatus,

several hundred thousand dollars in bribes. Colum Lynch, Oil-Food Official Pleads
Guilty,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
9,
2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080800150.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
200. Corruption was not completely overlooked because a January 2004 CPA
Order created the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, which had a mission to
adopt and enforce anti-corruption and government accountability measures, but the
Commission was apparently unconcerned with current instances of corruption since
they set the jurisdiction for this new entity to trace back possible instances of
corruption to July 17, 1968. Delegation of Authority Regarding The Iraq
Commission on Public Integrity Order No. 55 of 2004 §§ 3-4 (CPA, Iraq).
201. David Oliver, the head of finance for the CPA, remarked: "I have no idea,
I can't tell you whether or not the money went to the right things or didn't-nor do
I actually think it is important." Mark Gregory, Baghdad's 'Missing' Billions, BBC
(Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6129612.stm (last
visited Dec. 3, 2015). After the interviewer criticized Oliver for his callous attitude,
Oliver remarked: "Billions of dollars of their money disappeared, yes I understand,
I'm saying what difference does it make?" Id. Oliver claimed that he gave uncertain
amounts of cash to the Iraqi government and because nothing was left, the
allocations must have been provided to the right people. Id. Most countries have
(or aspire to improve) accounting systems that require audits of corporations and
governmental entities to ensure integrity of the accounting process, to protect public
interests, and to prevent white-collar crimes from occurring, but the CPA disbursal
process seemed to be rather rudimentary and without protections that would instill
integrity. Towards a New Era in Government Accounting and Reporting, PwC 3,
14
(Apr.
2013),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/assets/pwc-global-ipsas-surveygovernment-accounting-and-reporting-pdf. pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2015) (assessing
in a survey of 100 countries that there needs to be "[b]etter integration and
comparability in government accounting systems" but "[t]he G20 has recently
emphasized the need for transparent, comparable public sector financial reporting,
including public sector balance sheets" and for "sound, transparent accounting
systems" in order to restore confidence and having sustainable financial
management).
202. Charles R. Babcock, Contractor Fraud Trial to Begin Tomorrow, WASH.
POST (Feb. 13, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/l2/AR2006021200732.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
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which meant that the only semblance of government was the CPA and
the U.S.-appointed heads of ministry and appointed members of Iraqi
interim governments. 203 During the CPA' s tenure and up until the date
that the CPA authority expired, the CPA distributed billions of dollars
in cash to its appointees. 204 Congressman Henry Waxman presided
over investigations and remarked: "The CPA handed over $8.8 billion
in cash to the Iraqi government even though that new government had
no security or accounting system. No one can account for it." 205Not
to denote that this unequivocally transpired, but perhaps it is no
wonder that the appointed interim Iraqi government permitted the
CPA to do whatever it wanted; giving billions of dollars in cash would
ostensibly be one of the most straightforward methods of illegally
bribing or at least arousing loyalty from appointees. 206 The money
belonged to the people of Iraq as a whole, 207 but currency might also
just vanish and not effectively stimulate the economy despite the
humanitarian need. 208
203. DILIP HIRO, SECRETS AND LIES 312-13 (2003). Resolution 1483 required
disbursement of funds under the Development Fund for Iraq in "coordination" or
"consultation" with the governance authority, which would officially become the
IGC in October 2003. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93, 1113-14, 16(b); see also S.C.
Res. 1511, supra note 190, 1123- 24.
204. The CPA was apparently having so much fun distributing pallets of
bundled $100 bills without consequence or documentation that it requested another
$1 billion from the Federal Reserve just hours after its official authority expired. HR
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 179, at 9. Thankfully,
the request was denied by the Federal Reserve because "the CPA no longer had
control over Iraq's assets." Id.
205. Gregory, supra note 201.
206. The CPA actions may very well fall into the jurisdiction of a number of
international agreements that prohibit bribery of public officials and seek to prevent
corruption. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43
(1998); Inter-American Convention on Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 105-39 (1998); Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,
Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173; G.A. Res. 58/4 Convention Against Corruption (Oct.
31, 2003).
207. Government employees, private sector entities, and organizations, could
not be paid from what was earmarked as Iraq's own revenues unless the CPA made
payments in US dollars. Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of
Procurement-Aided Unilateralism as a Paradigm ofForeign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 45-46 (2007). In fact, the impropriety was even more direct as Ahmed Chalabi,
the Iraqi exile instrumental in producing fabricating witnesses prior to the invasion,
and his group became the direct recipients of funding when they established the Iraqi
Reconstruction and Development Council. Id. at 44.
208. The adverse consequence of "dollarizing" the Iraqi economy, not
implementing accounting controls, and being unable to locate billions of dollars,
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The next part considers the impact of occupation construction
activities. The part untangles the significance of Iraq's debt-stricken
financial status in conjunction with multinational cost of
reconstruction in section A, addresses the details of no-bid contracts
granted by the U.S. government in section B, presents instances of
fraud and greed that increased the cost to U.S. taxpayers in section C,
and accents the U.S. military's role in securing the reconstruction
process in section D. In short, resources shifted to construction
projects that benefited multinationals while burdening Iraqis with high
cost and lower employment and encumbered American taxpayers with
additional spending.
V. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
A. Obligation to Rebuild and the Financing of Construction

Perhaps implicitly conducted pursuant to a moral and
international law obligation to repair or replace what was destroyed
during war, 209 U.S. authorities undertook projects to rebuild
infrastructure that was damaged by bombing operations during the
1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion. 210 Experts estimated that
construction would cost between $55 and $90 billion. 211 Over 150
companies 212 received $21 billion for construction projects and as

would be unlikely to protect against the possibility of bundles of cash being stashed
or otherwise removed from the economy instead of being spent to stimulate the
economy. This is also a breeding ground of corruption because political appointees
could be persuaded by financial gain or be particularly amenable to the occupation's
dictates, despite broadly-based and opposing public desires. The occupation
authorities were operating like a bank and payroll officer for payees in a country in
which the vast majority of the population was impoverished and in dire need of
services.
209. See generally INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT xi, 11, 39-42 (2001) (setting forth standards for
post-conflict situations, noting that the international community must support the
intervention, and emphasizing that the intervener [and perhaps the international
community] has a "responsibility to rebuild" what was destroyed during war).
210. Bali, supra note 94, at 442.
211. Rebuilding Iraq 'Will Cost $55bn, ' BBC (Oct. 3, 2003, 1:17 PM),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3160800.stm (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (referring to the $55 billion World Bank estimate and the $90 billion estimate
by McKinsey consulting).
212. Blood and Oil: How the West Will Profit From Iraq's Most Precious
Commodity,
INDEPENDENT
(Oct.
22,
2011),
available
at
http://www.independent.co. uk/news/world/middle-east/blood-and-oil-how-thewest-will-profit-from-iraqs-most-precious-commodity-431119 .html (last visited
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much as $117 billion for security objectives related to
reconstruction, 213 which was a sum that was several times Iraq's GDP
in 2004. 214 Funding came from U.S. taxpayers, loans, 215 and Iraqi oil
revenues. 216
Iraq required tremendous investment because the country
lacked capital for reconstruction and had accumulated massive debt
from previous wars, sovereign obligations undertaken by Hussein's
regime, and the ridiculously excessive level of debt (up to $350
billion) imposed as damages by the Security Council following the
invasion of Kuwait. 217 Prior to the invasion in 2003, Iraq was unable
to service existing debt obligations because Security Council
restrictions prohibited oil exports starting in the early-1990s and there
were revenue limits imposed by the U.N. Oil for Food Program.
Emphasizing how Iraq's massive existing debt could undermine
reforms, 218 Joseph Stiglitz remarked that Iraq was facing further
Dec. 4, 2015).
213. SIGIR, supra note 2, at 9. $117 billion is the difference between the
estimate of $138 billion and $22 billion. Anna Fifield, Contractors Reap $138B
From
Iraq
War,
CNN
(Mar.
19,
2013),
available
at
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/business/iraq-war-contractors/ (last visited Dec.
4, 2015) (noting that $138 billion was spent on "private security, logistics and
reconstruction contracts"). However, this number could be much higher if one
assumes that reconstruction was a critical precondition to alleviating hostilities
within the Iraqi population and ending the occupation and if it is assumed that U.S.
military operations were also critical to the security of reconstruction.
214. Donor Activities and Civil Society Potential in Iraq, U.S. INST. PEACE
(July 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/srl24.pdf (last
visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that Iraq's GDP was approximately $19 billion in
2004).
215. See generally ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 74; see also IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 63 (Jeremy Brecher,
Jill Cutler & Brendan Smith eds., 2005) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY];
Juhasz, supra note 115 (reporting that through mid-January 2007, U.S. taxpayers
had already provided $50 billion in loans to reconstruct Iraq and that these
expenditures were allocated to U.S. companies and banking interests).
216. Hmoud, supra note 64, at 450 (discussing that the CPA assumed control
over the Oil-for-Food Program from the UN and that the new program, called the
Development Fund for Iraq could be disbursed for "humanitarian needs, repair of
Iraq's infrastructure, disarmament, economic reconstruction, and the costs of Iraqi
civilian administration.").
217. Bejesky, Currency Cooperation, supra note 59, at 100-02 (noting that
Kuwaitis filed 2.68 million claims, seeking more than $350 billion in compensation,
when Kuwait's annual GDP averaged $41.3 billion).
218. Shortly after the 2003 invasion, Iraqis found themselves in a position
similar to that faced by the three-decade-long debt crisis that still plagues developing
countries. See generally NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DEVELOPfNG
COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 2007).
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economic travail by "[p ]iling more debt onto Iraq's already huge
obligations" and warned that "[i]f Iraq's economy falters as a result of
a misguided economic reconstruction program based on shock
therapy, the country will be further indebted with little to show for
it." 219
The reconstruction process was exorbitant and slighted
rational labor market mechanisms because Iraq was strained with high
unemployment while multinational corporations employed foreign
workers who were paid many times more than Iraqis would have been
paid. 220 Representative Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member
on the U.S. House Committee on Government reform, wrote in a
September 2003 memorandum that congressional investigations
revealed that "many reconstruction projects could be reduced by 90%
if the projects were awarded to local Iraqi companies rather than to
large government contractors like Halliburton or Bechtel. 221
Congressional records revealed specific procurement examples in
which multinational corporations cost between five and over one
hundred times more than an Iraqi construction firm would have
charged for the same project. 222 Had Iraqi companies been awarded
219. Stigli tz, supra note 4 5.
220. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 15-16; Juhasz, supra note 115 (noting the
excessive cost of American companies and that "Iraqis argue that they have the
knowledge, skill and experience to conduct the reconstruction themselves").
Consequently, not only were labor market mechanisms not being pursued because
higher-paid foreign workers often executed employment tasks instead of locals, but
Iraqis had more difficulty finding employment even though much of the
infrastructure that needed to be repaired was a direct consequence of a foreign
power's bombing operations. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 215, at 63
(emphasizing that Iraqis were prohibited from fixing critical infrastructure); Tiefer,
supra note 207, at 4-5 (stating that Iraqis were prevented, in certain industrial
sectors, from working to rebuild their own country).
221. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, U.S. House
of Representatives, to Joshua Bolten, Director, U.S. Office of Management and
available
at
Budget
(Sept.
30,
2003),
http://rense.com/general43/iraqicompanieswouldsave.htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2015); see also Tiefer, supra note 207, at 42 (accentuating the common complaint
that American firms do all of the work even though Iraqis do not have as high of
overhead expenditures as U.S. design-build firms); Kinan Obeidin, The Iraq
Reconstruction Contracts: Limiting the Sources for Government Contracts, 29 J.
LEGAL PROF. 259,263 (2005).
222. U.S. H. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIV., HALLIBURTON'S GASOLINE OVERCHARGES, 3 (2004),
available at http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/waxman_gas_overcharges.pdf
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Waxman] (reporting that foreign contractors
charged about $25 million to refurbish police stations in Basra while an Iraqi
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the same contracts, there might have been a lower unemployment rate,
an alleviation of social discontent caused by adverse economic
conditions, a lower cost of construction for U.S. taxpayers, and a
mitigation of the perception of a profiteering bonanza for
multinational corporations. 223
Explanations provided for the dearth of Iraqi companies
receiving contracts included that Iraqis were not sufficiently
experienced224 and that local contractors "lacked the requisite
insurance. 225 There was a heightened risk of loss due to violence and
foreign insurance companies began to deny claims for losses inside
Iraq, 226 but Iraqi companies had a fractional cost of construction at risk
irrespective of actuarial insurance calculations. Iraq also had a preinvasion tort law system to address liability in the event of faulty

company could have done the work for about $5 million); Klein, supra note 96
(reporting that the CPA purchasing concrete walls from foreign companies at a price
of $1,000 each when seventeen Iraqi state-owned cement companies could have
produced the walls at $100 each). In a case where locals were hired, Major General
David Petraeus explained to members of the House Committee on Government
Reform that he hired Iraqis to fix a cement plant for $80,000, but engineers from US
companies quoted a price of $15 million to complete the same contracts. Waxman,
supra note 222, at 2.
223. Waxman, supra note 222, at 2 ("The question we need to confront is
whether the Administration is putting the interests of companies like Halliburton and
Bechtel over the interests of the American taxpayer and the Iraqi people. When
inordinately expensive reconstruction projects are awarded to high-cost federal
contracts with close political ties to the White House, the Administration can create
a lose-lose situation: not only do U.S. taxpayers vastly overpay for reconstruction
services, but Iraqis are denied urgently needed employment opportunities.").
Multinational construction companies were not required to pay much Iraqi tax and
could repatriate profits.
224. Charles Bronowski & Chad Fisher, Money as a Force Multiplier: Funding
Military Reconstruction Efforts in Post-Surge Iraq, 2010 ARMY LAW. 50, 61 (2010)
(quoting service members who mentioned that "the United States has concerns that
Iraqis are becoming too reliant on U.S. expertise in executing reconstruction
programs rather than developing organic Iraqi capabilities").
225. Waxman, supra note 2221, at 5.
226. See. e.g. T . Christian Miller, AIG Faces Inquiry Over Medical Care for
U.S.
Contractors,
L.A.
Times
(Apr.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/22/nation/na-aig22 (last visited Dec. 9, 2015)
(stating that AIG denied 44% of all serious injury claims) . The inability to attain
private insurance required more dependence on federal compensation programs.
War Hazards Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 1701-1712 (enacted on Dec. 2, 1942);
see also Compensation for Injury, Disability, Death, or Enemy Detention of
Employees of Contractors with the United States, 20 C.F.R. pt. 61 (2005).
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construction, 227 while CPA Order 17 made contractors from coalition
countries immune from liability in Iraqi courts. 228
B. No-Bid Contracts

The occupation's procurement process was not administered
with abounding regard for competitive bidding procedures, but instead
was candidly called a "reconstruction racket," 229 the "coalition of the
billing," 230 and corruptly managed. 231 No-bid procurement contracts
were awarded to companies with close connections to Iraqi defectors
who urged for the war 232 and American corporations with links to
influential U.S. politicians.
Criticism was leveled over conflicts of interest as then-Vice
President Cheney's former company, Halliburton, 233 was awarded
227. There was a legal structure that might have provided a foundation for
liability because pre-invasion Iraqi tort law did provide causes of action that could
compensate for harms based on intent, negligence, and strict liability standards.
Civil Code of 1990 art. 202 (Iraq). The existing Iraqi tort law system was recognized
as the applicable law in a Georgia District Court case that involved two
contractors-an American plaintiff and Kuwait Gulf defendant. Baragona v. Kuwait
Gulf Link Transp. Co., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2007). It is not
clear why Iraqi construction companies would be required to carry additional
insurance beyond that which would normally be required in their own country.
228. Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF -Iraq, Certain
Missions and Personnel in Iraq Order No. 17 (revised) of 2004 §§ 1(11), 4(2)-(3)
(CPA, Iraq); see also §§ 1(1)-(2), 2(1) ("[u]nless provided otherwise herein, the
MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel, property, funds and
assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal process.").
229. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 78.
230. Derek Gregory, Vanishing Points: Law, Violence, and Exception in the
Global War Prison, in TERROR AND THE POSTCOLONIAL 55, 81 (Elleke Boehmer &
Stephen Morton eds., 2010) (stating term used by Peter Singer).
231. Gathii, supra note 36, at 73 7.
232. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32370, THE COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITIES 22-24 (2005) (reporting that a $327 million contract was given to Nour
USA in November 2003 to equip the new Iraqi armed forces, that there were
nineteen other bidders and Nour's bid was $231 million lower than Bumar Group,
that Nour's president A. Huda Faouki is an alleged friend of Ahmad Chalabi, and
that Nour had no experience because it was formed in May 2003, but the contract
was eventually canceled because of procurement contract dispute filings). A lower
price is favorable but possible conflicts of interest and lack of experience can
undermine a legitimate procurement process.
233. Many criticized this connection between the vice president and
Halliburton as a conflict of interest. Robert Bryce & Julian Borger, Cheney is Still

Paid by Pentagon Contractor: Bush Deputy Gets Up to $Im From Firm With Iraq
Oil Deal, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2003. 10:02 AM), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/12/usa.iraq5 (last visited Dec. 4,
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with the contract to rebuild existing Iraqi oil production facilities in a
secretive no-bid contract two weeks before the invasion. 234 Contract
rights morphed into $2.4 billion in revenues for Halliburton over three
years 235 and Halliburton reported a 62% increase in revenues. 236 KBR,
Halliburton's subsidiary, was awarded at least $39.5 billion in federal
contracts related to the Iraq war. 237 Some funds were unaccounted for
and Halliburton and other American companies later became subject
to a series of Congressional investigations over overbilling. 238 During
2015) (noting that Cheney was still being paid up to $1 million a year in "deferred
compensation" from Halliburton while he was vice president); Aaron Blake, Rand
Paul in '09: Cheney Pushed Iraq War to Benefit Halliburton, WASH. POST (Apr. 7,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post2014),
politics/wp/2014/04/07 /rand-paul-in-09-cheney-pushed-iraq-war-to-benefithalliburton/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that Senator Rand Paul suggested
Cheney was clearly at the forefront of pushing for war and that his own company
(Halliburton) benefited).
234. Abigail H. Avery, Weapons of Mass Construction: The Potential Liability
of Halliburton Under the False Claims Act and the Implications to Defense
Contracting, 57 ALA. L. REV. 827, 837-38 (2006) (noting that the contract was
consummated in March 2003). This followed after Halliburton's submission of
initial planning documents for rebuilding (in fall 2002), which was also an awarded
contract. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY
AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC 144 (2004); CBS, Halliburton Defends No-Bid Iraq
Contract, INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE (Apr. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/artic1e3 l 4 l .htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (stating that there was no competition for contracts worth up to $7 billion and
that Cheney was instrumental in placing Halliburton into that privileged position).
235. HENRY A. WAXMAN, H. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, MINORITY STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., HALLIBURTON'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE
RESTORE
IRAQI
OIL
2
CONTRACT,
3(2006),
available
at
http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/reports/RI02_audit.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
[hereinafter House Comm. on Gov't Ref.]; See also Martha Minow, Outsourcing
Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 990 (2005); Erik Eckholm,
F.B.I. Investigating Contracts With Halliburton, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 10/29/politics/29contract.html?_r=O
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that the FBI initiated an investigation because
many called the no-bid awards illegal procurement contracts).
236. Minow, supra note 235, at 992-93.
237. Fifield, supra note 213.
238. Neil King, Jr., Halliburton 's Iraq Cost Examined, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12,
2004,
12:01
AM),
available
at
http://www.wsj.com/artic1es/SB10790563916l753571 (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(noting "significant deficiencies" in accounting for KBR billing); T. Christian
Miller, U.S. Officials Suspected ofEmbezzlement in Iraq, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2005),
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/05/world/fg-fraud5 (last visited
Nov. 23, 2015) (reporting that $100 million dollars in US taxpayer money had
disappeared).
Among the many scandals, independent auditors found that
Halliburton was importing fuel from Kuwait at double price, thus charging US
taxpayers twice as much (as it was a "cost-plus" contract in which Halliburton
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a Congressional hearing, Marie de Young, a Halliburton employee,
testified that "we, essentially, lost control of the project and paid
between four to nine times what we needed to fund that project"
because there were two or three layers of subcontracts. 239
Bechtel was also awarded infrastructure repair contracts
pursuant to fairly open-ended terms. 240 Even as the bidding process
became more competitive, in January 2004, Sheryl Tappan, head of
Bechtel's proposal team, called the competition a "sham" and a
"farce," and opined that she had never witnessed such an "arrogant"
and "egregious" Pentagon bidding process. 241 U.S. federal law
requires competitive bidding for government procurement and WTO
Government Procurement Agreement rules mandate nondiscriminatory treatment for WTO member countries, 242 but
received whatever its costs were plus a profit)). The auditors called the Kuwait oil
purchases "highway robbery" and "outrageously high." House Comm. on Gov't
Ref., supra note 235, at 4. In a series often Pentagon audits during 2004-05, auditors
discovered that Halliburton' s overcharging resulted in $219 million in "questioned"
costs and $60 million in "unsupported costs." Id. Furthermore, Halliburton had
been warned multiple times in 2003 and 2004 and was consistently told of
"significant deficiencies" in its cost estimations and even that it "universally failed
to provide adequate cost information as required," but the Pentagon kept awarding
Halliburton new contracts. Id. at 2-5, 6-14; Avery, supra note 234, at 839-41
(describing other investigations into Halliburton, including an admission that two of
its officials had been receiving kickbacks, engaging in overcharging for food
services, and failing to perform services adequately); see also Tiefer, supra note 207,
at 12, 28-30.
239. Minow, supra note 235, at 1011.
240. 1 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS, USA, KUWAIT: TAXATION
LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK 171 (2012) (USAID awarded an initial $34.6
million on April 17, 2003 to Bechtel for the "repair, rehabilitation or reconstruction
of vital elements of Iraq's infrastructure. . . . includ[ing] . . . electrical grids,
municipal water systems and sewage systems," and then left open the allocation of
additional funding); see also Elizabeth Becker, Aftereffects: The Contractors;

Feeding Frenzy Under Way, as Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of the
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
21,
2003),
available
at
Action,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/21/world/aftereffects-contractors-feedingfrenzy-under-way-companies-all-over-seek-piece.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
( stating that within a month, experts were predicting that the contract would be worth
about $20 billion).
241. House Comm. on Gov't Ref., supra note 235, at 5.
242. The CPA was acting on behalf of the Bush Administration and was an
effective unit of the US government, meaning that US obligations under WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) rules would apply. Michael Davey, To

the Victor Go No Spoils? The United States as an Invading Military Force and Its
Relationship With Economic Contracts in Occupied Iraq, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV.
721, 735 (2005) (discussing Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States (1974)
and emphasizing that the Charter forbids any State from discrimination based on
"political, economic or social systems").
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multinational companies from non-coalition countries were often
deemed ineligible. 243 General rules for competitive bidding were
frequently exempted by raising the "public interest exception," which
alleged that reconstructing Iraq is indispensible for national security
and defense purposes 244 and by stating that there was an "unusual and
compelling urgency" for utilizing the chosen procurement process. 245
Because financing for reconstruction came primarily from the
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds, U.S. taxpayers, and loans, 246
foremost policies underlying the prudent dispersal of funds on behalf
of the U.S. taxpayer-principal, included saving costs 247 and buttressing
243. David Palmeter & Niall P. Meagher, WTO Issues Relating to U.S.
Restrictions on Participation in Iraq Reconstruction Contracts, Am. Soc'y Int'l L.
(Dec. 26, 2003 ), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/29/wtoissues-relating-us-restrictions-participation-iraq-reconstruction (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (explaining that 63 countries were eligible); Tiefer, supra note 207, at 43
(noting the frequent ineligibility due to a MNC's home state not being a member of
the coalition).
244. U.S. Faces Backlash Over Contracts, CNN (Dec. 10, 2003, 10:40 PM),
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/10/sprj.irq.contracts/
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) ("It is necessary for the protection of the essential security
interests of the United States to limit competition for the prime contracts for these
procurements to companies from the United States, Iraq, Coalition partners and force
contributing nations.").
245. Other exceptions that permit granting procurement contracts without a
competitive bidding process include when only a single supplier is qualified to
provide the service or product in question; when an agency confronts an "unusual
and compelling urgency" for supply of a good or service that would otherwise
seriously injure the government; when there is a case of national emergency; when
a federal statute, treaty or the terms of an international agreement permit something
other than a competitive process; and when the head of an agency decides that
bypassing competitive procurement procedures are in the public interest. 41 U .S.C.
§ 253 (2012). It was generally the "urgency" and public interest exceptions that
were espoused as exceptions to granting sole-source contracts. See Jeffrey MarburgGoodman, USAID 's Iraq Procurement Contracts: Insider's View, 39 PROCUREMENT
LAW. 10 (2003).
246. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the
Reconstruct oflraq and Afghanistan of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, 117 Stat. 1225
(enacted Nov. 6, 2003); Halchin, supra note 232, at 8, 19, 21-22.
24 7. Given that contractors received appropriated federal government funds,
there could have been potential violations of Federal Acquisition Regulations, the
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), and military procurement rule violations,
all of which require full and open competition to obtain competitive pricing and save
costs. Halchin, supra note 232, at 24, 33; 41 U.S.C. § 3301 (2015); 48 C.F.R. §
6.101 (2003); 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (2015). Although, ambiguity was created in that the
former Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy explained that
"the CPA is not the United States Government. Accordingly, if one enters into a
contractual relationship with the CPA, one is not entering into a contractual
relationship with the United States. The rights and remedies available to parties
contracting with the United States will not be available in a contractual relationship
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public integrity, 248 and on behalf of the Iraqi public-principal, included
the obligation of the CPA to operate as a responsible fiduciary because
occupation law and Iraqi funds were at stake. 249 Journalist Naomi
Klein, author of The Shock Doctrine (2007) and a critic of the CPA's
imposed reforms and the procurement process in Iraq, confronted
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan with Greenspan's
definition of "crony capitalism" from his book and remarked:
You said "when a government's leaders or businesses routinely seek
out private sector individuals or businesses and in exchange for political
support bestow favors on them, the society is said to be in the grip of
'crony capitalism." You say, "The favors generally take the form of
monopoly access to certain markets, preferred access to sales of
government assets, and special access to those in power." I kept
thinking about Halliburton, Blackwater, Lockheed, and Boeing. You
were referring to Indonesia at the time, but I'm wondering, according
to your definition, [whether you think the U.S. is a crony capitalist
economy] ... we're seeing [extraordinary] contracting emerging, as in
the words of the New York Times, a fourth arm of government. [The]
[f]ront page of the New York Times talks about $6 billion being
investigated for criminal activity in contract allocation in Iraq. 250

with the CPA."
SIGIR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS LEARNED IN
CONTRACTING AND PROCUREMENT 24 (2006); United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. V.
Custer Battles, L.L.C., 376 F. Supp. 2d 617,631 (2005) (Defendants alleging that
agents were assured that the CPA was a "separate and distinct entity from the
warring powers" and "under no circumstances was it the U.S. government").
248. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5268 ("[F]raud erodes public confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently
and effectively manage its programs ... Even in the cases where there is no dollar
loss ... the integrity of quality requirements in procurement programs is seriously
undermined.").
249. Funding can be allocated as CPA operational expenses, but fiduciary
obligations require the occupier to act in the best interest of the principal. Hague
Regulations, supra note 120, art. 48 ("If, in the territory occupied, the occupant
collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall ... be
bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory ... ");
Id. art. 49 ("If, in addition to the taxes . . . the occupant levies other money
contributions in the occupied territory, this shall be for the needs of the army or of
the administration of the territory in question."). Iraqi oil revenue is part of this
public trust; the resources belong to the Iraqi people. Because revenues were
required to be used for the benefit of the people and for the occupier to "administer"
the territory, locking in "no bid," large-scale and long-term procurement contracts
in favor of firms from the occupier's state for reconstructing the country at
approximately ten times the amount that Iraqis would have charged could violate
fiduciary obligations. Being unable to account for billions of dollars aggravates the
problem. See id.
250. Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi Klein on the Iraq War, Bush's Tax Cuts,
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Greenspan retorted that government corruption with the
private sector is not the "dominant force" in the U.S. economy, while
corruption was the dominant force in Indonesia under Suharto. 251 This
is a valid distinction, but foreign direct investment in developing
countries is known to be an environment rife with corruption252 and
the argument that elected government officials have been allegiant to
key businesses that support politicians in a manner that is detrimental
to public interest and voters, such as by lobbying and with campaign
contributions from the private sector, 253 has been a criticism of
American democracy for decades. 254 Even the purveyor of public
information-the American media-is compromised by capitalist
interests. 255
Economic Populism, Crony Capitalism, and More, supra note 171.
251. Id.
252. Clemens Fuest, Giorgia Maffini & Nadine Reidel, Do Corruption and
Taxation Affect Corporate Investment in Developing Countries?, in CRITICAL
ISSUES IN TAXATION AND DEVELOPMENT 65, 65 (Clemens Fuest & George R.
Zodow eds., 2013); Jose Godinez, Corruption in Latin America and How It Affects
Foreign Direct Investment (FD!): Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions,
in BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND MARKET ENTRY CHALLENGES IN
LATlN AMERICA 31, 40 (Mauricio Garita & Jose Godinez eds., 2015).
253. Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 2353, 2354 (2007) ("Money in politics can be viewed as an assault on political
equality - wealthy actors subjugating common citizens - and yet it can also be
viewed as a form of political expression - free speech. This is enough to cause a
rational observer to throw up her hands."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications ofPublic Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA.
L. REV. 273, 283 (1988) (the private sector influence on government can "skew
public decision-making toward private rent-seeking and away from public interest").
254. There are debates over campaign finance. See generally ROBERT E.
MUTCH, BUYlNG THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2014); C.
Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1998). Lobbying can be controversial. See generally DIRTY DEALS? AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LOBBYlNG, POLITICAL INFLUENCE, AND CORRUPTION (Amy H.
Handlin ed., 2014); RONALD DWORKlN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?:
PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 129 (2006) ("Large campaign
contributors purchase what is euphemistically called 'access' to officials; in fact they
often purchase not merely access but control."). CPA reforms can lead to a
socioeconomic system and complaints that have long been voiced about the US
economy-that the American political system is beholden to corporate agendas
rather than to voters and the populace.
255. See generally Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War,
48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343 (2012) (noting that dominant media organizations may
not always adequately accentuate essential political concerns to Americans even
though the media are the purveyors of information and must support US democracy,
but the media industry exists in a conglomerate structure, is driven by profitability,
and may not always effectively check government as the Framer's of the
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C. Fraud in Contracting

The procurement process for reconstruction in Iraq was not
only inefficient by demonstrating favoritism for foreign companies
over local companies and potentially operating improperly by granting
no-bid contracts to select foreign companies, 256 but the Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that billions of dollars
allocated for construction contracts were wasted or missing under
allegations of fraud, including fraud perpetrated by U.S.
contractors. 257 Consequently, the False Claims Act ("FCA"), which
has been used for over a century to recover federal funds attained
through fraudulent means 258 (including through qui tam actions by
private citizens on behalf of the government), 259 was employed to
recoup funds acquired by fraud perpetrated in Iraq. Even though the
FCA specifies that "no proof of specific intent to defraud is required"
to impose liability, 260 which means that deliberately ignoring or
recklessly disregarding the truth will satisfy the contractor's mens rea
Constitution intended, which was a prime complaint about the media's performance
in persuading Americans to support the invasion of Iraq).
256. See supra Parts V(A)(B).
257. James Glanz, Audit Describes Misuse of Funds in Iraq Projects, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at A2; An Oversight Hearing on Accountability for
Contracting Abuses in Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Dem. Pol Pol'yComm., 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement by Alan Grayson, Attorney, Grayson & Kubli, P.C.) (attorney
representing whistleblowers testifying that "[h]alf of the $18 billion in Iraq
reconstruction funds are unaccounted for. Senator Dorgan has said that there is an
orgy of greed among contractors in Iraq, and there is ample evidence to back that
up"). More recent government investigations placed missing Iraqi money at $6.6
billion. Paul Richter, Missing Iraq Money May Have Been Stolen, Auditors Say,
at
available
2011),
13,
(June
TIMES
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/201l/jun/13/world/la-fg-missing-billions-20110613 (last
visited Dec. 4, 2015).
258. An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United
States, Pub. L. No. 37- Chap. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (reenacted as False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33(2000)); see also Avery, supra note 234, at 828-29; Dan L.
Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members Have
Standing to File "Qui Tam" Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 45, 47 (2004); Jessica C. Morris, Civil Fraud Liability and Iraq Reconstruction:
A Return to the False Claims Act's War-Profiteering Roots?, 41 GA. L. REV. 623,
646 (2007) (noting that between 1987 and 2002 over $6 billion was recovered
through FCA actions); Erik Eckholm, Judge Limits Statute's Ability to Curb Iraq
Contractor Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2005), available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9BOCEED6123DF931A25754COA9639C8B63 (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(calling the FCA a "potent weapon against contractor fraud").
259. 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b)-(d) (2012).
260. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(l)(B) (2012).
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for the statute, 261 commentators expressed that it was notably
challenging to effectively hold contractors responsible under the FCA
for missing reconstruction funds. 262 If losses cannot be successfully
recovered, a contractor could be the recipient of a windfall gain, which
is to the detriment of Americans and Iraqis.
There were periodic warnings of the ongoing danger of fraud
in Iraq 263 and over the first five years of occupation, fraud losses
aggregated into the billions of dollars. 264 Losses were attributable to
diverse shams, including outright schemes of artifice perpetrated by
foreigners who sometimes had no proven track record of success with
the business entity contracting with the CPA, 265 billing authorities
inflating invoices, 266 employees of established multinationals
261. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l), (b)(l) (2012) (creating liability for "knowingly"
made false claims presented to the government, which includes "actual knowledge"
of falsity, acting in "deliberate ignorance of the truth," or acting in "reckless
disregard of the truth or the falsity of the information").
262. M.M. Harris, Commentary, Patriots and Profiteers: Combating False
Claims by Contractors in the Iraq War and Reconstruction, 59 ALA. L. REY. 1227,
1227 (2008).
263. Reuters, U.S. Audit Finds Fraud in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2004)
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/31 /international/middleeast/31 audi.html
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2015) (reporting that one month after the CPA was dissolved, the
CPA' s Inspector General's office explained that it had been conducting 69 criminal
investigations involving fraud, with 27 of those investigations still open). As of July
30, 2007, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction noted that there were
"57 ongoing investigations into fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq reconstruction, 28 of
which are at the Department of Justice for prosecution," and there were five
convictions, 13 arrests, and 8 pending trials. SIGIR, QUARTERLY REPORT AND
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONG. 13 (2007), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/get-trdoc/pdf?AD=ADA509376&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (last visited Dec. 4,
2015); Morris, supra note 258, at 627 (referencing George Washington University
expert Steven L. Schooner warning that the "potential for chicanery is great and the
potential universe of whistle-blowers is mind-boggling.").
264. Sarah E. Barnes, Comment, Categorizing Conflict in the Wartime
Enforcement of Frauds Act: When Are We Really at War?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 979,
991 (2010); Erin M. Brown, Note, The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, the
Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act, and the War on Terror, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 313, 331 (2009) (legal amendments were "presented as a way to address the
numerous accounts of fraud in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns").
265. 60 Minutes, The Mother of All Heists, CBS NEWS (June 14, 2007)
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/l0/l9/60minutes/main2109200.shtml (last
visited Dec. 4, 2015) (reporting that the CPA granted a $1.2 billion contract to a
Jordanian company that was founded just weeks earlier with $2,000 in capital, and
$750 to $800 million of that amount was stolen).
266. For example, in February 2006, the first security firm fraud case to proceed
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embezzling funds, 267 and CPA officials engaging in wrongdoing. 268
The dearth of suitable CPA auditing controls probably did not
contribute a deterrent with an expected high risk of punishment269 but
Private military
there were some successful prosecutions. 270
contractors ("PMCs") were also involved in protracted legal battles
over billing, but in many cases PMCs fared better than initial press

to trial involved the Alexandria, Virginia firm Custer Battles, which was accused of
bilking the American taxpayer for millions of dollars in overbilling in security
contracts for the Iraqi airport, the Iraqi currency exchange, and other venues.
Babcock, supra note 202. After a three-week trial, the jury found Custer Battles
liable to repay $3 million dollars in fraudulent invoices, which invoked the FCA's
tremble damage provisions. Morris, supra note 258, at 628. Several months later
Judge Ellis granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter oflaw and stated
that the action did not meet the element of being "presented .. .to employees or
officers of the United States acting in their official capacity." United States ex rel.
DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, L.L.C., 444 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (E.D. Va. 2006).
However, the case was reversed on this ground and the jury verdict was reinstated.
Ellen Nakashima, Court Revives Suit Over Iraq Work, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpat
available
(last
dyn/content/article/2009/04/ 10/AR2009041003448 .html ?hpid=topnews
visited Dec. 4, 2015).
267. Michael S. Devine, Procurement Fraud, 2006 ARMY LAW. 132, 134
(stating that an employee of Halliburton subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown, and Root
(KBR), and a Kuwaiti businessman, were charged with "devising a scheme to
defraud the United States of more than $3.5 million related to the awarding of a
subcontract to supply fuel tankers for military operations in Kuwait"); see also
Minow, supra note 235, at 990; Wilkinson, supra note 153, at 234-35; Paul D.
Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L.
129, 136-37 (2010) (noting that in 2009, Halliburton was required to pay $559
million for engaging in corruption in Nigeria, Halliburton manager Albert Jack
Stanley was convicted for bribing Nigerian officials, and Halliburton moved its
corporate headquarters from Houston to Dubai apparently to attempt to reduce
liability and avoid criminal jurisdiction).
268. James Glanz, Wide Plot Seen in Guilty Plea in Iraq Project, N.Y. TIMES
at
available
2006),
2,
(Feb.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/intemational/middleeast/02reconstruct.html?
n=Top%2FN ews%2Fintemational%2FCountries%20and%20Territories%2Firaq&
_r=O (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that Robert J. Stein, who was a CPA
comptroller and funding officer, pied guilty to several felonies that involved
kickbacks on lucrative contracts and embezzlement); Griff Witte, U.S. Contractor
Admits Bribery for Jobs in Iraq, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/18/AR2006041801742.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(reporting that an American businessman, Philip H. Bloom, pied "guilty to
conspiracy, bribery and money-laundering charges" related to "getting
reconstruction contract for his companies").
269. See supra Part IV(D) (discussing lack of CPA auditing controls).
270. SIGIR, supra note 2, at 9 (reporting that there were 82 convictions
resulting from investigations).
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releases of alleged wrongdoing intimated. 271 The common perception
of PMCs being implicated in improper dealings was presumptively
due to the breathtakingly lucrative contracts that awarded PMC firms
an average of $445,000 for each employee per year, while an Army
Sergeant, carrying out comparable tasks, would earn $51,100 to
$69,350 per year. 272
Perhaps the most probative and encompassing implication
from these deficits in the procurement process is that the combination
of the CPA unilaterally dictating new resource-shifting laws and
institutions on Iraq and employing entities engaged in fraudulent
practices furnished an abysmal example of American "democracy"
and remiss adherence to the "Rule of Law" 273 even though the CPA' s
newly instituted civil justice institutions and practices sought to
improve then-existing Iraqi institutions274 and provide a favorable
archetype. These episodes of departure between promise and practice,
along with CPA Order 17' s endowment of immunity to contractors
from Iraqi legal process 275 so that the Iraqi government or people did
271. Christina Wilkie, Iraq War Contractors Fight On Against Lawsuits,
Investigations, Fines, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2013 7:34 AM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/iraq-war-contractors_ n_ 2901100.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (stating that "many of the war's most controversial, and
well-paid, U.S. contractors faced relatively few repercussions for their conduct in
Iraq," but over the last two years "contractors are on the defensive against allegations
of torture, fraud, negligence and extrajudicial killings").
272. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 3053, CONTRACTOR'S SUPPORT OF U.S.
OPERATIONS
IN
IRAQ
14
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12iraqcontractors.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
273. FINNIS, supra note 42, at 270-71 (noting that the "Rule of Law" is the
name frequently given to describe an effectively functioning legal system, which is
a system that fosters compliance with clear, coherent, and stable rules, and holds
government officials accountable).
274. Daniel Bodanky, Establishing the Rule of Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP.
L. 119, 129 (2004) (relaying also that some US military perceptions were that Iraq
had "no rule oflaw," "Iraqis are all corrupt," and they were prone to taking "bribes").
Corruption is predominantly attributable to poverty. Michael Johnston, Poverty and
Corruption,
FORBES
(Jan.
22,
2009.
6:00
PM),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01 /22/corruption-poverty-development-bizcorruption09-cx_ mj_0122johnston.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
275. Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, supra note 228, § 4(2)
("Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to
the terms and conditions of their contracts .... "); Atif Rehman, Note, The Court of
Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 493,498 (2006) (Order 17 resulted
in granting "complete immunity to contractors and military personnel from
prosecution in Iraqi courts for killing Iraqis or destroying local property"); J. Stephen
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not possess a civil fraud action against wrongdoers, 276 suggest that the
"Rule of Law" might be perceived as a mere catchphrase to shift blame
for the Bush Administration policies in Iraq. 277 An Iraqi judge opined:
We don't need you to come here and tell us about what law is. We
invented law .... We are the people who figured law out, thousands of
years ago. But now your soldiers are coming in and telling us what to
do, and you're not respecting our legal traditions or legal process. The
first thing the Americans did after the war was to announce that they
were immune from Iraqi legal process. So, if an American commits a
crime, they're completely immune, there's nothing that we can do about
it. The Americans are unaccountable. How can this be the rule of
law? 278

D. Reconstruction Progress and the Role of Military Reconstruction
Engineers

With such significant deficits in the procurement contracting
process and oversight, it was not surprising that reasonable estimates
of contract completion at the expected reconstruction expense often
fell short, and this was another reason for Iraqi dismay with the
occupation. Three years into the occupation, the U.S. Inspector
General's report on reconstruction noted that while $22 billion had
been spent on water, sewage and electricity projects, the infrastructure
With poor performance on
remained at prewar levels. 279
280
Iraqis lacking essential commodities while being
reconstruction,
Shi, Comment, The Legal Status of Foreign Military and Civilian Personnel
Following the Transfer of Power to the Iraqi Interim Government, 33 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 245, 255-56 (2004).
276. Morris, supra note 258, at 635.
277. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict
Rebuilding: A Critical Examination, 49 WM & MARYL. REV. 1347, 1348 (2008)
("this newfound fascination with the rule of law is misplaced" as it is invoked as the
supposed causal mechanism that leads to human rights violations, threats to security,
and even economic development but it really is a "desire to escape from politics by
imagining the rule of law as technical, legal, and apolitical").
278. Bodanky, supra note 274, at 130.
279. Daniel McGrory, In The Chaos ofIraq, One Project is on Target, GLOBAL
at
available
2006),
3,
(May
POLICY
(last
https://www .globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/3 7122.html
visited Dec. 4, 2015) (noting that less than halfof the electricity and water projects
had been completed and only six of 150 planned health centers had been completed,
but one notable project that was on target was the massive U.S. embassy complex).
280. Iraq in Ruins, supra note 29 ("Despite Iraq being rich in natural resources
and the US pouring money into its economy for over a decade, Iraqi infrastructure
is constantly failing and people are forced to beg"); Bleak Picture ofIraq Conditions,
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confronted with a debt crisis 281 and believing that they could have
more successfully repaired their country, 282 and officials in Canada,
Iraq, Japan, and other countries chastising the American rebuilding
progress, 283 U.S. officials affixed blame on insurgencies. 284 Yet, the
existence of insurgencies may have been predominantly attributable
to the fact that a high percentage of Iraqis opposed the U.S. military
presence in the country285 and that there were poor humanitarian
conditions, which eventuated into a circular effect of violence, inferior
reconstruction, more extensive expenditures for security and
reconstruction, 286 and additional opposition to the military
occupation. 287
The Pentagon offered a surprisingly optimistic view of the
rebuilding process 288 and the Bush administration and the U.S.
BBC
(Mar.
17,
2008,
12:59
AM),
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7299914.stm (last visited Dec. 4, 2015)
(reporting that while still under the U.S. occupation, the Red Cross stated that the
humanitarian situation in Iraq was "among the most critical in the world").
281. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 78.
282. Tiefer, supra note 207, at 43 (reporting that Barham Salih, Iraq's minister
of planning and development cooperation, stated that reconstruction efforts by US
contractors had proceeded "very, very, very slowly so far" and postulated that Iraqis
could have rebuilt needed infrastructure with more success).
283. Id.
284. See generally T. CHRISTIAN MILLER, BLOOD MONEY: WASTED BILLIONS,
LOST LIVES, AND CORPORATE GREED IN IRAQ 132-50, 162-63 (Brown Little, 2006).
285. Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 105; What the Iraq Public Wants: A
WorldPublicOpinion.org Poll, PROGRAM ON INT'L POLICY ATTITUDES 4 (Jan. 31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan06/Iraq_Jan06_ rpt.pdf (last visited
Dec. 4, 2015) (noting that in January 2006, 87% of Iraqis wanted a timeline for
withdrawal (64% Kurds, 90% Shia, and 94% Sunnis supported withdrawal).
Overall, 47% oflraqis supported attacks on U.S. troops (16% Kurds, 41 % Shia, and
88% Sunnis supported attacks on U.S. troops)). Id. at 5.
286. MILLER, supra note 284, at 163; David Barstow, Security Companies:
Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/ 19/world/security-companies-shadow-soldiersin-iraq .html ?pagewanted=all (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
287. ARNOVE, supra note 85, at 102-03 (stating that "[t]he [U.S.] is spending
one billion dollars a week [for the U.S. military] in its occupation of Iraq, excluding
the cost of 'reconstruction"' for the benefit of US corporations and noting that "[t]his
is in addition to the tens of billions of dollars already allocated for the invasion of
Iraq, the tens of billions the [U.S.] pays to maintain its massive military arsenal in
the Middle East and Asia, and the tens of billions the government spends to support
'allies' such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates").
288. GARTH S. JOWETI & VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND
PERSUASION 20-21 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that some US military authority apparently
engaged in propaganda operations to misrepresent the success of the rebuilding
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military proclaimed that nation-building was one of the U.S. military's
core m1ss1ons. In December 2005, Bush issued NSPD 44, which
sought to "promote the security of the United States through improved
coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and
stabilization" in other countries. 289 The National Security Strategy in
2006 stated that the U.S. military fights wars and rebuilds after the
war. 290 Military manuals, officials and personnel further promoted
this nation-building mission. 291 The military did undertake these
process in Iraq by sending letters, allegedly written by US troops, to US newspapers
to praise the rebuilding process, but when investigators tracked down the six troops
whose names and hometowns appeared on several of eleven identical form letters,
the six troops all denied writing the letters).
289. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT'L SEC. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE
44, MANAGEMENT OF INTERAGENCY EFFORTS CONCERNING RECONSTRUCTION AND
STABILIZATION 1-2 (2005) ("The United States has a significant stake in enhancing
the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially
those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them
establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market
economies.").
290. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 16 (2006).
291. HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07,
at
available
2008),
(Oct.
iv
OPERATIONS
STABILITY
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-07.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (discussing
'joint doctrine" and the role of the US military in supporting broader government
operations: "[Stability operations encompass] various military missions, tasks, and
activities conduced outside the United States in coordination with other instruments
of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide
essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief'); HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL
at
available
2006),
(Dec.
forward
COUNTERINSURGENCY
3-24,
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%20333.5%20part%20l.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (reporting that General David
Petraeus and Lieutenant General James Amos explain that "[S]oldiers and Marines
are expected to be national builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to
help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding
infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local
governance and the rule oflaw"); Peter W. Chiarelli & Stephen M. Smith, Learning
from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing/or a Dangerous Future, 87
at
available
(2007)
6
2,
REV.
MIL.
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume6/j anuary_2008/ I_08 l
_pf.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (explaining "like it or not, until further notice the
U.S. Government has decided that the military largely owns the job of nationbuilding."); Timothy Austin Furin, Legally Funding Military Support to Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 2008 ARMY LA w. 1, 13
( stating that with these new emphasized missions that there is a continuum on which
operations should be categorized between "peace to crisis to conflict" and that
"commanders must consider stability operations when planning each phase of any
military operation."); Stigall, supra, note 99, at 40 (US Army Judge Advocate
claiming: "Military assets are the preferred choice for the task of state-building ...
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obligations in Iraq, but political will might not best be represented by
adding new realms of general expertise to core U.S. military missions
because there are questions of international community and U .N.
consent to specific "nation-building" missions, Congress'
constitutional authority to assent to new military missions, 292 the U.S.
military's choice to not emphasize educating its leaders with "rule of
law" operations, 293 and the fact that the military occupation was
arguably not particularly effective in nation-building in Iraq. 294
[and are] a generally indispensable element of any state-building operation ... [T]he
modem military's diverse and robust continent of professionals ... [provide]
'combat arms' soldiers ... [and] a host of trained professionals such as physicians,
lawyers (Judge Advocates), and engineers-all of whom are uniformed service
members .... They are able to operate in post-conflict states and assist in rebuilding
or developing legal infrastructure."); J. Porter Harlow, Publishing Doctrine on
Stability Operations and the Rule of Law During Conflict, 2010 ARMY LAW. 65, 66
("Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors.");
Perhaps this new civilian function makes logical sense given the newly-obscure roles
prevailing with the Pentagon's eagerness to privatize everything, including military
services, during the occupation. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Economics of
the Will to Fight: Public Choice in the Use ofPrivate Contractors in Iraq, 45 CUMB.
L. REV. 1 (2014/2015).
292. It is true that Congress appropriated military funds for reconstruction and
for military occupation. See Furin, supra note 291 , at 22 (stating that "the postconflict SSTR [Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction] operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are developing well since Congress has appropriated funds to
accomplish the SSTR mission." (This might not necessarily be a general sanction
for the future.)).
293. Ronald T.P. Alcala, Vanquishing Paper Tigers: Applying Comparative
Law Methodology to Enhance Rule ofLaw Development, 2011 ARMY LAW. 5, 5, 11
("[T]he military is not the designated lead for rule of law but will frequently serve
as the de facto lead during stability operations.").
294. Secretary of Defense Gates contended that the Department of Defense
does not have sufficient personnel or the skill sets required to operate effectively in
Iraq. Eric Talbot Jensen, Post-Conflict Transition, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 35, 37 (2007); Tiefer, supra note 207, at 1-8 (noting that the military occupation's
"nation building" and economic rebuilding operations were a drastic failure). One
rationale for this role for the Pentagon role is that there is not enough civilian
capacity in the U.S. government to address these issues. Dan E. Stigall, The Thickest
Grey: Assessing the Status of the Civilian Response Corps Under the Law of
International Armed Conflict and the U.S. Approach to Targeting Civilians, 25 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 885, 900 (2010); Furin, supra note 291, at 1 ("First, DOD
formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated stability operations to a
core military mission on par with combat operations. Second, DOD broadened its
military planning guidance to more fully address pre-conflict and post-conflict
operations. Third, DOD developed a joint operations concept to serve as the basis
for how the military will further support Stabilization, Security, Transition and
Reconstruction (SSTR) operations."); Conference: From Autocracy to Democracy:
The Effort to Establish Market Democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan: Panel 2:
Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 171, 189 (2004)
(Professor Wiarda stating "I think neither the United States nor the international
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Nonetheless, with CPA directives blatantly contravening restrictions
of occupation law, the best protection against the reversal of the CPA' s
initiatives, rule frameworks, and potential shifts in property rights and
power, is to ensure the security of those rules with a long-term military
occupation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 occurred after the Bush
administration delivered six months of false allegations about Iraq
possessing chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear weapons
program, and ties to al-Qaeda, all of which were false. 295 Due to the
invasion, a humanitarian crisis unfolded and the Iraqi government was
displaced, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 to
affirm a mandate to administrate the country under occupation, but did
not permit the CPA to unilaterally revamp Iraq's legal system. 296 The
CPA's involvement began as a progression that contended
democratization and market economies were interdependent, but
continued with more contentious reforms, including by deepening
foreign investment, advocating for privatization, dollarizing the Iraqi
economy, and enacting over thirty new economic codes with
rudimentary and nearly unrestricted capitalist provisions. 297 The CPA
agencies are very good at nation-building or even know what they are doing in most
cases.").
295. Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 33, at 464; Bejesky, Weapon
Inspections, supra note 33, at 350-69
296. In a March 26, 2003 memo, British Attorney General Goldsmith stated:
In short, my view is that a further Security Council resolution is needed to authorise
imposing reform and restructuring of Iraq and its Government. In the absence of a
further resolution, the UK (and US) would be bound by the provisions ofinternational
law governing belligerent occupation, notably the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
1907 Hague Regulations.

Roberts, supra note 152, at 609. Goldsmith further added that the "imposition of
major structural economic reforms would not be authorized by international law."
Id. Goldsmith is correct about occupation law restrictions, but the rest of his
statement is a red herring. Resolution 1483 permitted a temporary occupation
primarily to address humanitarian suffering and economic hardship, search for
weapons of mass destruction, and ensure that Iraqis designed viable government to
address humanitarian concerns, but absolutely nothing was said about the CPA
dictating unilateral structural economic reforms. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 93,
1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c)(i), 9 (noting that when the Resolution mentions "institutions" and
reform initiatives, surrounding language affirms that it is the Iraqi people who
determine their "own political future" and request that all UN members, UN organs,
and "the Authority" were to "assist" Iraqis who will determine and establish their
own institutions).
297. See supra Parts II, III, IV.
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broadly construed the explicit language of Resolution 1483 and
imposed unilateral dictates without Iraqi support and without a
democratic government, while, at the same time presiding over an
abysmal rebuilding process, intensified violence and insecurity, and
corrupt relations with contractors and appointed representatives of
local Iraqi bodies. 298 The CPA assumed it possessed all the answers
to Iraqi preferences even before a democratic government was
elected. 299 A 2004 World Bank report specifically addressed this
issue, recognized the lack of Iraqi public ratification for economic
reforms, and contended that Iraqi democratic will should not alter
CPA dictates because investor confidence was paramount:
Crucial to investor confidence is the credibility of the transitional and
new governments' approach to the existing legal framework and the
predictability of their basic policies. Such sustainability will require
achieving adequate consensus at various levels on an underlying

298. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION
BUILDING 77-80 (2004); Richard B. Bilder & Michael J. Matheson, Book Note, The

International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980-2005,
102 AM. J. INT'L L. 687,691 (2008) ("[T]he essentially unilateral effort of the United
States since [the invasion] has resulted in even worse violence, insecurity, and
corruption."); Patterson, supra note 183, at 468, 474 (noting that the CPA did not
comply with occupation law, which endows a right to remedy wrongs); see also
Zahawi, supra note 7, at 2298. See generally Part IV(D), V.
299. The White House Future of Iraq project was already planning for an
occupation and reforms as much as a year before the invasion. Hassen, supra note
144. See generally Newt Gingrich & Mark Kester, A Security Strategy of

Transforming Societies: From Stabilizing to Transforming Societies as the Key to
American Security, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5 (2004) (unabashedly contending
that the US should transform societies around the world). Common Iraqis opposed
the occupation of their country and from the perspective of Americans, Mr. Bush
left office with one of the worst presidential approval ratings in history and it was
specifically because of Iraq and the economic recession, which might have been
partially due to the excessive spending for the Iraq war. Bejesky, Politico, supra
note 19, at 31, 105. The extrapolation of occupier power and unilaterally-conceived
mission of "what is best for the Iraqi people," seems to be based on distorting
occupation law and an assumption of omniscience about Iraqi desires conjoined with
myths. Roberts, supra note 152, at 601 (remarking of the depiction of the occupant
as a bastion of progress can beget a "dangerous mix of crusading, self-righteousness,
and self-delusion"). Some assumptions, in the author's opinion, during the existence
of the CPA seem to include: "We believe that we can install democratic institutions,"
"We believe that market mechanisms and capitalism are the essence of freedom,"
"We believe Iraq's public sector requires privatization for the good of the Iraqi
people," "We believe foreign investment is needed is essential for your economic
well-being and that foreign investment should be given national treatment
protections," and "We believe foreign oil company investment in needed."
Meanwhile, it was not the "Coalition" that was imposing dictates, but the "United
States," and more specifically the Bush Administration.
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economic strategy. For continuity, the sovereign Iraqi government will
need to confirm its broad support for legislation issued by the Coalition
Provisional Authority and clearly signal that pending administration
regulations critical to the implementation of fundamental legal
provisions will be developed and implemented. 300

If Iraqis had been in a position similar to other Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (with a cash-rich state-owned
oil industry) so that revenues could have been generated from their
own oil wealth, Iraqis would not have needed foreign investment.
This was actually an insurmountable possibility because of the debt
Iraq held throughout the period when the Security Council restricted
Iraqi oil sales. Because of Iraq's financial position at the time of the
2003 invasion, new laws were imposed by the CPA, including
frameworks that benefited foreign corporations, and likely became
socialized and solidified301 with a long-term military occupation. If
the populace is not content with its new society, laws, and institutions,
conditions could be ripe for insurgencies because some percentage of
the population lost power, wealth, government benefits, employment,
and habitable conditions. 302 Indignation may be even more pointed if
perceptions of disenfranchisement are attributable to a foreign
invasion and an unwarranted military occupation. 303 If commentators
concur that corruption is immoral, harmful to public interest, and
undermines justice and fair contract and property law protections, 304 it
300. Building a Sustainable Investment Climate in Iraq,, 33-34 (World Bank,
Reconstructing Iraq Working Paper No. 1, Sept. 27, 2004).
301. Mills, supra note 140, at 199.
302. See Stephens, supra note 29; Iraq in Ruins, supra note 29.
303. Perceived discrimination may be heightened when these events occurred
in a country where most of the population is poor, aspires for a better life for one's
family (which might best be attained by developing favorable connections to the
occupying authority), and is beholden to a social and economic reality that is
enforced by three hundred thousand American troops and security force personnel.
It should also be remembered that the Pentagon was attempting to covertly
manipulate Iraqi public opinion by employing advertising and consultancy firms to
place favorable pro-US occupation propaganda in Iraqi newspapers and also running
its own media outlets in Iraq. See Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or
Propaganda? Targeted Messages and Tardy Corrections to Unverified Reporting,
40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 1029-49 (2012).
304. Omar Azfar, Young Lee & Anand Swamy, The Causes and Consequences
of Corruption, 573 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 42, 46, 53 (2001); Peter
Egger & Hannes Winner, How Corruption Influence Foreign Direct Investment: A
Panel Study, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 459, 460 (2006); M. Shahid
Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of
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is no wonder that Iraq has recently been tom apart by sectoral
allegiances amid claims of discrimination and suppression. 305 Sunnis,
Kurds, and a high percentage of Shia wanted Prime Minister Maliki,
who operated as a dictator and corruptly enriched himself at public
expense, 306 to resign, 307 but he practically had to be tom kicking and
screaming from office, 308 only to be appointed vice president a few
days later. 309 Maliki has been the target of hostility, but deeper
problems must be resolved to achieve a peaceful reconciliation to the
present crisis. Economic viability for all Iraqis and ending economic
and political discrimination should be at the core of discussions.

Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 441,453 (1989).
305. See Sandy Berger, U.S. Must Forge New Ties With Iraq to Tackle ISIS
Threat, TIME (Aug. 17, 2014 ), available at http://time.com/3130983/sandy-bergeriraq-isis-maliki/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) (Sandy Berger, national security advisor
during the Clinton administration, stating that "Maliki had governed in such an
overtly anti-Sunni fashion that the Sunni tribes in the north had come to hate him
more than they feared ISIS"); Al-Ali, supra note 30.; Maginnis, supra note 30;
Damon & Tawfeeq, supra note 30.
306. See supra Part I.
307. Renae Merle, Air Force Erred with No-Bid Iraq Contract, GAO Says,
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P282607 .html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) ("Our Defense Department has continued to
pay, through pliant contractors, for a flock of Iraqi political exiles as our paid
political agents in Iraq"). Perhaps it is possible to direct a foreign country's policies
after a government holds elections as elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats
may be amenable to and beneficiaries of foreign influence. Even politicians who
have been democratically-elected can become amenable because that influence is
often what empowered them in the first place. Pepe Escobar. The Roving Eve:
Behind the Anbar Mvth. ASIA TIMES (Sept. 14. 2007). available at
htto://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle East/II14Ak04.html (last visited Dec. 4,
2015) (noting how Maliki, as the US 's puppet, has abused his office).
308. See Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, Why Iran Has Finally Let Go of Maliki, BBC
(Aug. 13, 2014), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east28777142 (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
309. What Do Iraqi Leaders Hope to Hear From Obama's Strategy?, PBS
(Sept. 10, 2014 6:06 PM), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/iraqileaders-hope-hear-obamas-strategy/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
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